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“Otherwise, it’s War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of 
China 1969-1974 
by Robert Kent 
 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon inherited a much different Cold War than that which 
existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Writ large, the project of ‘containing’ communism 
appeared to be falling apart.  The Soviet Union was ascendant in Eurasia, the Vietnam War was 
continuing to grind down American power projection, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
was emerging as a potential partner on the world stage. Despite the uncertainty of the situation, 
both President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger saw these circumstances as 
an opportunity to reshape the global balance of power. Key to this plan was a diplomatic 
‘opening’ to the PRC, which would engender a tripolar balance of power to counter the Soviet 
Union’s grip on Asia. Yet, the major obstacle in the way of this plan was the ongoing American 
recognition of the Nationalist Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the existing defense 
treaty Washington and Taipei.  
For decades, Peking was adamant that Washington needed to forswear all support for 
Taipei as a precondition for full diplomatic ties between the United States and PRC. 
Unfortunately, such a formula appeared to give Communist China a path to reunify Taiwan with 
the Mainland through military action. To maintain peace in East Asia and to protect American 
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credibility, the United States could not afford to allow the PRC to use force to settle its dispute 
with Taiwan. This thesis argues that the Nixon Administration sought to use diplomacy with the 
PRC and its security ties with the ROC to ensure a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait crisis 
during the US opening of Communist China. In doing so, the US side aimed to find a balance 
between a diplomatic partnership with Peking and a defense relationship with Taipei. This 
challenges conventional views about the Nixon Administration’s willingness to unilaterally 
abandon its commitments to Taiwan in order to open the People’s Republic of China. This thesis 
further contends that the roots of the modern American approach of ‘strategic ambiguity’ 
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War in Asia was on President Richard Nixon’s mind the morning of February 1, 1973. In 
a White House meeting that day with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, he addressed 
the interlinked issues of the winding down Vietnam War, the improved relations with the PRC, 
and the ongoing troop withdrawals from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. This last 
issue, in particular, had loomed over the Administration’s head since he took office. Since 1954, 
the United States had maintained both an alliance with the ROC and a strong troop presence 
there, but now, it was gradually scaling back its deployments on the island. The process of doing 
so was causing apprehension among policymakers in Washington. As the President noted in this 
conversation, “[what] we have to have in mind is what the hell we do on Taiwan.”1 
The Nixon Administration was walking a fine line between Taipei and Peking, fearing 
the notion that the PRC might see the American troop withdrawals as an assent to annex the 
‘rogue province’ of Taiwan through military means. That the communists had sought for the past 
four years to pressure Nixon into annulling the 1954 defense treaty added fuel to this fire. These 
terms were unacceptable to Washington. Reneging on its defense commitments to Taiwan would 
soil US credibility, cost Washington an important asset in the Asia-Pacific region and place the 
ROC on the island at risk of annihilation. Hence, the Nixon Administration remained adamant 
that for a total American withdrawal from the island, the Communists on the mainland would 
have to forswear any designs of military action against Taiwan. In the meantime, it was 
imperative that the United States use its security ties with the ROC as a means to ensure a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Straits crisis- “otherwise,” Nixon noted minatorily, “it’s war.”2  
 
1 “Nixon in China Again,” February 1, 1973 in Douglas Brinkley and Luke A. Nichter, The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Boston ; New 
York: Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016), 34.  
2  “Nixon in China Again,” February 1, 1973 in Brinkley and Nichter, The Nixon Tapes: 1973, 35. 
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This short observation by the President was not simply a statement of hyperbole, but 
instead reflected the potentially dangerous tensions that existed between Peking and Taipei well 
into the 1970s. Simultaneously, the conversation also reflected the continuing interest which the 
United States had in settling the Taiwan Straits crisis through peaceful means, even after Nixon’s 
1972 visit to China. Too often, however, scholarship has misread the US-ROC defense 
relationship under Nixon. In works which examine Nixon’s ‘opening’ of the PRC, Taiwan is 
largely sidelined within the context of the developing ties between Washington and Peking. 
Those who have examined Nixon’s approach to Taiwan during this time have in large part 
characterized it as a ‘sellout’ of the ROC. In their formulation that the Nixon Administration had 
shorn itself of the responsibility of defending Taiwan, this study affirms that scholars of this 
‘sellout’ camp are asking the wrong questions. Recently declassified documents from both 
American and Chinese archives reveal a much different reality about the US-ROC defense 
relationship. Using these sources, this thesis instead reveals the degree to which the United States 
modified the principles of this alliance while still retaining it in practice. With this in mind, it 
instead poses the question of how the Nixon Administration was able to square the circle of its 
defense ties to Taiwan and its ‘opening’ to the PRC. To this end, Washington recognized the 
need to soften the hardline anti-communism which underscored the early Cold War containment 
of Peking, while simultaneously upholding the security ties which it had initially cultivated to do 
so. Considering the profound diplomatic and defense relationship between the United States and 
ROC, Taiwan simply could not be abandoned for the sake of convenience.  
The major reason this sellout narrative must be challenged is to gain not just a better 
understanding of the American grand strategy in Asia, but to examine how the US effort to 
maintain security ties with Taipei laid the groundwork for the modern relationship of strategic 
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ambiguity towards Taiwan. The American posture towards Asia embodied in the Nixon Doctrine 
was not part of an American plan to give China a complete sphere of influence in East Asia, but 
to instead limit direct American military involvement while keeping close ties to its allies in the 
region- the ROC being one of them. As such, the new American posture in the Far East was far 
from appeasement, but represented a new understanding of what ‘containing China’ meant. 
Rather than through military force, moderating Peking’s behavior would come through 
diplomacy and engagement. This, too, would help ensure Taiwan against invasion by the PRC. 
Moreover, the sellout narrative cannot account for how the United States transformed but still 
maintained its security ties to Taiwan, setting the stage for the Carter-era approach of strategic 
ambiguity towards the ROC. 
As Nixon’s aforementioned February 1st conversation with Kissinger reflected, the 
United States’ East Asian foreign policy had been in a state of flux since the President took 
office in 1969. This sprang in large part from the disastrous, ongoing American involvement in 
the Vietnam War and its spillovers into neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The conflicts had cost 
the United States much in terms of men sacrificed, resources expended, and, on a global scale, 
perceptions of American credibility.3 Worse yet, the failing war effort in Indochina spoke to the 
fraying nature of American strategy in the region writ large. Through its involvement in the 
Vietnam War and other operations in East Asia, the United States had sought to contain the 
influence of the PRC, long believed to be the benefactor of violent Marxist action across the 
 




continent.4 Now, it seemed that Peking’s efforts to sow communist agitation in the region were 
succeeding, and it was sapping American power projection around the world.5 
The Nixon Administration brought in a new perspective on the role of the United States 
in East Asia through the Nixon Doctrine, and simultaneously, harbored hopes of a Sino-
American diplomatic rapprochement. As early as 1967, President Nixon spoke about the need for 
constructive engagement with the PRC. In his mind, the United States “simply [couldn’t] afford 
to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its 
hates and threaten its neighbors.”6 Warmer diplomatic relations with the PRC would allow the 
United States to scale back its containment operations in Indochina, and in turn, draw down its 
direct troop presence in East Asia. Moreover, Communist China could prove an important asset 
against the interests of the Soviet Union in the region. Given the existing animosity between 
these two communist powers, Nixon believed that the United States could leverage one against 
the other to accomplish goals including arms reductions treaties, trade negotiations, and most 
immediately, ending the Vietnam War. The prospects for such an initiative only grew in the 
aftermath of the Sino-Soviet border clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969.7 With the PRC under 
threat on its northern flank and the War in Vietnam growing more desperate by the day, the time 
 
4 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold 
War, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), 140.   
5 Note: For the sake of consistency, I will use the Wade-Giles translation of Chinese names throughout, in keeping with the 
common naming conventions of the Nixon era. As such, names like Beijing, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jeishi will be rendered as 
Peking, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, respectively.  
6 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, pp. 113-125. Reprinted by permission of 
Foreign Affairs, 2002. Copyright 1967 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969, Volume 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972 as “Article by Richard Nixon.” 
7 Note: The USSR and PRC retained competing claims to several islands located in the Ussuri River, which had remained 
unresolved since the days of the Russian Tsardom and the Qing Empire. Continued provocations on both sides of the disputed 
territory finally led to a Sino-Soviet skirmish on March 2, 1969. See: George C. Denney, Jr., “USSR/China: Soviet and Chinese 
Forces Clash on the Ussuri River,” March 4, 1969, US Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, National 
Security Archive.  
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was right to ‘play the China card.’ The only thing standing in the way of this diplomatic 
revolution was a longtime American ally, the ROC on Taiwan. 
To understand why the US-ROC alliance was such a sensitive issue for Nixon, the depth 
of the ties between Washington and Taipei must be briefly explained. The American partnership 
with the entity known as the ROC was forged in World War II, during which the United States 
fought alongside them to repel Japan’s invasion of China. Following the Allied victory in the 
conflict, President Harry S. Truman had high hopes for Sino-American cooperation. In his mind, 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang party (KMT) would lead China alongside the United States, 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union as one of the ‘Four Policemen’ of the world. This vision 
prevailed briefly until China was plunged back into civil war in August 1945, with Chiang’s 
KMT locked in conflict with Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The ensuing war 
resulted in victory for the communists and wide criticism for Truman, who was publicly scorned 
by then-US representative Nixon, for having ‘lost’ China to the Reds.8 Meanwhile, Chiang’s 
forces regrouped on the island of Taiwan, where they set up a government in exile, claiming to 
represent the sole legitimate ‘China’. The communists on the mainland contended much the 
same, asserting that their People’s Republic was the true heir to this legacy. Most concerningly 
for regional stability, neither side accepted that the civil war was over, and both dreamed of 
striking a final knockout blow against the other.  
While the PRC at present lacked the naval and air capabilities to wrest Taiwan from 
Chiang’s government, Peking was by no means quiet following its victory over the KMT on the 
mainland. In 1950, Communist China intervened in the Korean War on behalf of the Kim il-
Sung regime, helping to stalemate a US-led counterattack against the North. This reversal greatly 
 
8  Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: Volume I: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 240.  
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alarmed American policymakers, who now feared the prospect of PRC aggression against 
Burma, Hong Kong, Indochina, and more immediately, Taiwan.9 While containment of the 
Soviet Union continued apace in Europe, the United States now sought a defense framework to 
contain the PRC in East Asia. Combined with arms sales to anti-communist regimes like those in 
Thailand and South Korea, the United States also conducted several mutual defense agreements 
such as SEATO to accomplish this end.10 The Eisenhower Administration further ramped up the 
US strategic encirclement of the PRC when it concluded a Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) 
with Taiwan in 1954. This pact solidified a US-ROC commitment to containing the PRC, 
announced a security guarantee for the island against the communists on the mainland, and 
served as an American re-affirmation that the ROC was the legitimate embodiment of China. 
Hence, Taiwan was made a formal pillar of the United States’ Far East strategy. 
Taiwan traditionally enjoyed a strong base of support within the United States, ensuring 
that the alliance between Washington and Taipei would endure. This was embodied by the 
‘China Lobby’- a group of politicians and public intellectuals whose anti-communism fed into 
support for Chiang’s regime. Though more of a colloquial grouping than a formal political 
monolith, the Lobby touted notable adherents including Walter Judd, William F. Buckley, and 
Ronald Reagan. This group long acted as a stop-break against a number of initiatives to build ties 
between Washington and Peking, and “from the 1940s to the 1970s, no US president challenged 
the so-called China Lobby.”11 Though their power would decrease in successive decades, their 
 
9 National Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Estimate:  Communist China,” Washington, DC, January 17, 1951, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v07p2/d6 
10 Note: SEATO refers to the South-East Asian Treaty Organization. 
11 John Newhouse quoted in Ronald J. Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas, “The Rise and Fall and Rise of the China Lobby in the 




activism carried considerable weight even into the 1970s. As Kissinger would later remark to 
PRC Premier Chou En-lai, if Nixon had not been the one to open Peking, any other politician 
would have been “destroyed” by the China lobby.12  
Almost 15 years after the signing of the MDA, the assumptions which undergirded 
American policy in East Asia had been greatly altered. The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 
had convinced the Nixon Administration that the balance of power in Asia now favored 
Moscow, and that the USSR posed the more immediate threat to regional stability.13 Stemming 
from this, the Nixon Administration sought to counterbalance Soviet brinkmanship in the East 
through a diplomatic partnership with the PRC. While hesitant at first, Mao himself was partial 
to the idea of a Sino-American rapprochement.14 Yet, as PRC officials had made obvious to their 
American counterparts, the prerequisite for this was for Washington to sever its ties with the 
Chiang government in Taipei.15 This not only included the annulment of the 1954 MDA, but 
total derecognition of the ROC as a state. The Nixon Administration faced a dilemma in its 
China strategy- abandon an old ally to accomplish larger geopolitical goals in Asia or uphold its 
commitments while forsaking a breakthrough with the PRC. Consideration of the new limits of 
American power in East Asia thus acted to shape the alteration of the United States’ Taiwan 
policy during the Nixon Administration, which is the subject of this thesis.  
 
12 “Memorandum of Conversation” July 10, 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 
1969-1972, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d141. 
13 Chalmers M. Roberts, “U.S. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War is Rising, Russia Reported Eyeing Strikes at China A-Sites,” 
Washington Post, August 20, 1969, CIA FOIA Virtual Reading Room.  
14 Xiong Xiangui, “The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations,” Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao (CCP History 
Materials), no. 42 (June 1992): 81.  
15 John H. Holdridge, “Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger: Recent Indications of Peking’s Views on Taiwan Question in Sino-




Much has already been written of Nixon’s 1972 ‘opening of China’ and the events which 
led up to it. Inevitably, given the magnitude of such a development, the role of more tertiary 
actors like Taiwan has been overshadowed in the larger scope of US-PRC relations. However, 
when the ROC is featured in these discussions, Taipei acts more as an annoyance to be 
negotiated away through talks between Washington and Peking. This has led such scholarly 
works to either sideline the role of Taiwan in US-PRC negotiations, or worse yet, to characterize 
the United States as having surrendered the ROC to the communists.16 Both perspectives fail to 
analyze the subtle diplomatic game of delaying, denying, and ducking that American diplomats 
engaged in while at the negotiating table. As documents from American and PRC archives 
reveal, Taiwan was not simply one issue standing between Peking and Washington, but the 
primary issue between them. However, as this bilateral relationship deepened, both sides slowly 
moved to accommodate the needs of the other related to the US-ROC security relationship. This 
thesis argues that the Nixon Administration sought to use a combination of diplomacy with the 
PRC and a guarantee of Taipei’s security to encourage a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait 
crisis amid its opening to Peking. During this time, the Administration laid the foundation for the 
American policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ which persists in US-ROC relations to this day. This 
study also examines the notion of a ‘defense relationship’ as being more than a formal, legally 
binding set of principles. Herein, it postulates that a defense relationship is the sum total of a 
number of factors, including but not limited to a formal treaty of alliance, a guarantee of a state 
 
16 The ‘sellout’ metaphor has been almost universally adopted by critics of Nixon’s Taiwan policy. See: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 
“Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China ,” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (June 2005): pp. 109-135 ; 
Gang Lin and Wenxing Chou, “Does Taiwan Matter to the United States? Policy Debates on Taiwan Abandonment and Beyond,” 
China Review 18, no. 3 (2018): pp. 177-206; Frank N. Trager, “The Nixon Doctrine and Asian Policy ,” Southeast Asian 
Perspectives 6, no. 6 (1972): pp. 1-34, 12. 
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entity against outside aggression, the provision of defense materiel, and the use of diplomacy to 
ensure a peaceful resolution among otherwise hostile actors.  
Historiography 
This work aims to analyze the evolution of the US-ROC defense relationship during the 
Nixon era by engaging with three main fields of scholarly discussion on American foreign 
policy. First, it places Taiwan within historical conversations on the Nixon Doctrine, and 
examines how this framework informed the nature of the American defense commitment to the 
ROC. Second, this study explores the ways in which scholars have discussed the US-ROC 
relationship during the Cold War. In doing so, it focuses on the Nixon Administration as being a 
time of transition for the United States’ Taiwan strategy. Lastly, this thesis intersects with 
existing scholarly work on the Administration’s diplomatic opening to the PRC. This thesis 
demonstrates that the demands of Peking during this time demonstrably shaped how the United 
States conceived of both the rationale behind and execution of the terms of the 1954 MDA. As a 
whole, this study uses an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of foreign policy, blending 
together elements of history, political science, and international law.  
Placing Taiwan within the scholarly context of the Nixon Doctrine helps to underscore 
the ways in which relations between Washington and Taipei were part of a larger plan for 
American strategy in East Asia. Following the disaster of the Vietnam War, scholars have 
highlighted that the United States was in no position to maintain its considerable military 
presence in the region.17 In this situation, the Nixon Administration aimed to scale back its direct 
troop deployments in East Asia while maintaining its treaty obligations and furnishing its allies 
 




with defense materiel.18 This approach extended not only to the American role in Vietnam, but 
also to Thailand, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. At the time, contemporary scholars 
questioned the efficacy of Nixon’s plan, with academics such as Frank Trager claiming that it 
both damaged American credibility among allies and actually invited PRC aggression in the 
region.19 On the specific issue of Taiwan, Trager argues that it was naive for Nixon to “limit, in 
an as yet unclear way, our defense of an old ally, Taipei, in order to promote ‘peace’ with a 
longstanding enemy, Peking.”20 Earl Ravenal, a contemporary of Trager, advances similar 
criticism of the Nixon strategy for Asia. For him, the United States spread itself too thin in Asia 
to actually fulfill the alliances it sought to maintain, giving the United States the worst of both 
worlds- creating entangling alliances with no force to back them.21 Like many scholars of the 
time, Ravenal and Trager viewed the PRC as the major threat to be contained in Asia, and were 
skeptical of Nixon’s overtures to Peking. For them, the Doctrine was a capitulation to communist 
dominance of East Asia. However, in light of the Administration’s successful diplomatic 
containment of Communist China, Trager and Ravenal’s fears proved unfounded. Later 
evaluations of the Nixon Doctrine- and its application to Taiwan- have proven to be more 
favorable than its detractors initially argued. 
This thesis shows that these alarmist predictions for US strategy in Asia never took 
shape. Though Nixon’s contemporaries tended to criticize the Nixon Doctrine for appearing to 
arrange a sell out for Taiwan, modern historians have come to see it in a new light. In his study 
 
18 Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/informal-remarks-guam-with-newsmen 
19 Frank N. Trager, “The Nixon Doctrine and East Asian Policy,” Southeast Asian Perspectives, Issue 6, (June 1972), pp. 1-34.  




of US-ROC-PRC relations, Brian Paul Hilton offers the perspective that the Nixon Doctrine 
helped to strengthen Taiwan’s security against invasion by the mainland. By reducing the direct 
American presence in East Asia, the Administration assuaged Peking’s fears of military 
encirclement by the United States, making them more open to diplomatic dialogue with 
Washington.22 In this sense, the Nixon Doctrine acted to restrain the PRC from its designs on 
Taiwan more through diplomacy than direct US troop deployments. Historian Michael J. Green 
concurs with Hilton’s view. Out of the desire to reduce American military spending and extract 
the United States from Indochina, he contends that the Administration was also making a step 
towards Sino-American detente through the Nixon Doctrine.23 Despite friendlier relations with 
Beijing, Green highlights how the Administration still managed to retain its commitments to 
Taiwan, pursuant to the terms of Nixon’s grand design for Asia.24 As a result, the ROC fits 
neatly into the scholarly discourse on Nixon Doctrine, in that the American strategy towards the 
country involved a reduction of direct US troop presence, the furnishing of military and 
economic aid, as well as firm commitment to existing defense relationships. This thesis falls 
more in line with the Green-Hilton school of thought, and shows that Nixon’s plan for Taiwan 
both dovetailed with the strategy of the Nixon Doctrine and contributed to regional stability in 
the process. 
Scholarly discussion of US-ROC relations is essentially in agreement that the Nixon 
Administration substantially altered the partnership between Washington and Taipei. As Arthur 
 
22 Brain Paul Hilton, “A Tolerable State of Order: The United States, Taiwan, and the Recognition of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1949-1979,” Thesis, Texas A&M University, 247  
23 Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York: 




Waldron writes in “Back to Basics: The US Perspective on Taiwan-PRC Relations,” the period 
of 1969-1972 saw notable changes in the relationship between the two countries. However, he 
contends that these shifts came more in the form of changes in principle rather than in practice. 
While the United States accepted formulations like the ‘One China Policy’ and dispense with the 
notion of the ROC ‘liberating’ the mainland, security ties between the two countries persisted.25 
Meanwhile, Megan Herwig’s “The Balancing Act: Nixon, Taiwan, and the Tactics of Detente,” 
contends that in the early phases of this adjustment, the Administration struggled to find a proper 
balance between its commitment to the ROC and its outreach to the PRC.26 Across the three 
subjects she analyzes- the ending of the US Navy’s Taiwan Strait patrol, Taiwan’s ejection from 
the United Nations, and Nixon’s 1972 China trip- the Nixon Administration is presented as 
having to resolve the inherent contradiction of these two positions in the interests of furthering 
global detente. This thesis builds off Herwig’s work by placing emphasis on the defense aspect 
of the US-ROC relationship and examines the nature of it post-1972. 
One camp of US-ROC diplomatic scholars, meanwhile, has gone as far as to characterize 
Nixon’s Taiwan adjustment as being a full-on ‘sellout.’ Nancy Bernkhof Tucker’s “Taiwan 
Expendable?” is demonstrative of this approach. As she maintains, Nixon’s cavalier pursuit of 
diplomatic ties with Peking resulted in a sidelining of any scruples for American security ties 
with Taiwan. She writes that the Administration “fundamentally undermined U.S. credibility and 
sowed the seeds of continuing distrust in United States-Taiwan and United States-China 
 
25  James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, “‘Back to Basics: The US Perspective on Taiwan-PRC Relations,’” in Crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait (Ft. McNair, WA, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 327-347, 327. 
26 Megan Herwig, “The Balancing Act: Nixon, Taiwan, and the Tactics of Detente,” Thesis, University of North Carolina, 
February 2019, 7. 
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relations.”27 Jay Taylor in his book The Generalissimo views US diplomacy with Taiwan during 
the Administration to be nothing short of duplicitous. Amid what he views as a deceitful 
relationship, Nixon’s administration “from the top down had simply continued to attach ever less 
importance to the interests and feelings of its longtime nationalist ally.”28 Political scientists 
Gang Lin and Wenxing Chou are in agreement with this view, citing the years 1969-1972 as the 
nadir of US-ROC relations. In their view, “by tacitly accepting the prospects of peaceful 
unification of China, Washington was ready to abandon Taiwan, but more gracefully this 
time.”29 While the Nixon Administration may be rightly criticized for its less than forthcoming 
communication with Taipei during the opening to the PRC, the accusation that the United States 
acted with no regard for Taiwan’s security from 1969-1974 is incorrect. In fact, the United States 
under Nixon went to great lengths to preserve its defense ties with the ROC, hoping to avoid any 
indication that Washington was willing to “sell out its friends”30  
One recent work by Brian Paul Hilton has sought to push back on this sellout narrative. 
In “Taiwan Expendable: Reconsidered,” he explicitly disputes Tucker’s argument that the Nixon 
Administration unilaterally gave up the ROC to Peking. During the period of 1969-1972, he 
argues, “far from viewing Taiwan as an expendable asset, the Nixon administration actually gave 
much consideration to the island’s future and was reluctant to abandon the ROC despite the 
 
27 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China ,” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 
(June 2005): pp. 109-135, 110. 
28 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 2000), 555.  
29 Gang Lin and Wenxing Chou, “Does Taiwan Matter to the United States? Policy Debates on Taiwan Abandonment and 
Beyond,” China Review 18, no. 3 (2018): pp. 177-206, 180. 
30 Henry Kissinger, “Notes on Taiwan,” July 3, 1971,https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/loc-hak-464-6-1-9, 60. 
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improving Sino-American relationship”31 The United States, he affirms, acted in this sense to 
protect Taiwan’s security until a peaceful settlement could be reached between Peking and 
Taipei. While this thesis agrees with many of Hilton’s conclusions, it seeks to expand upon his 
journal article. Herein, this study focuses specifically on the US defense relationship with the 
ROC, expanding past Nixon’s 1972 visit to the PRC, assessing the role of triangular diplomacy 
in ensuring the island’s security, and citing the Administration’s Taiwan policy as the root of 
strategic ambiguity. In doing so, this thesis aims to take a more long-term look at US-ROC 
security ties in contrast to Hilton’s work, which is more concerned with developments up until 
February 1972.  
Any discussion of US-ROC relations from 1969 to 1974 will inexorably intersect with 
scholarship related to US-PRC ties during the Nixon Administration. Due to the mutual military 
and political legitimacy threats they posed to one another, US relations with one of the ‘two 
Chinas’ had a reciprocal impact on the other. The dynamic to be explored herein is how drawing 
closer to the PRC would affect outstanding commitments which the United States had with the 
ROC. James Mann’s About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from 
Nixon to Clinton offers a very broad look at the evolution of US-PRC relations since the 1970s. 
In his characterization, Nixon and Kissinger moved quickly to normalize relations with Peking, 
almost to the point of folly.32 The one issue on which the Administration did not budge on, 
however, was Taiwan. In Mann’s view, the sluggishness of progress on this front was due less to 
Nixon and Kissinger’s principles than it was to external factors like impeachment and the limits 
 
31 Brian Paul Hilton, “Taiwan Expendable? Reconsidered,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 25 
(2018), 296-322, 298. 
32 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: 
Random House International, 2000), 50-52. 
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of executive authority.33 Still, Nixon’s opening to China “effectively banished from American 
foreign policy the unreality…[that] Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist regime on Taiwan was the 
legal government for the Chinese mainland.”34 Dealing solely with the Nixon Presidency, Chris 
Tudda’s A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China 1969-1972 offers a succinct narrative 
about the challenges that the Administration faced in its opening to the PRC. As he argues, “the 
President and his national security team...and the PRC government boldly moved along parallel 
lines to forge a new relationship that fundamentally altered the Cold War.”35 While offering a 
coherent ‘highlight reel’ of Nixon’s China diplomacy, much of its effects on Taiwan are left 
unexplored. Like Tudda’s work, Robert S. Ross’s “US Policy Toward China: The Strategic 
Context and the Policy-Making Process,” offers a grand strategy portrait of US-PRC relations 
under Nixon. According to him, “the United States’ China policy was fundamentally shaped by 
the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and the corresponding value of strategic cooperation 
with Beijing.”36 Taiwan, meanwhile, features briefly as an existing issue between Washington 
and Peking, he writes that “to the extent that the Soviet threat appeared more severe, Washington 
sought closer U.S.-Chinese relations and adopted a more flexible policy regarding bilateral 
conflicts, including the Taiwan issue.”37 These studies, while offering in depth analyses of US-
PRC relations under Nixon, ultimately have similar shortcomings. These three works are 
archetypes in that they reflect a tendency to emphasize the larger strategic goals of the China 
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opening (detente, triangular diplomacy, arms control) over tactical issues such as Taiwan. This 
study bridges the gap between the means of constructive ambiguity towards the ROC and the 
ends of grand strategy. The first step to understanding the full picture of Nixon’s opening to 
China, I affirm, is to start with Taiwan- the ‘other China’.  
‘Constructive ambiguity’ was without a doubt the most enduring contribution of the 
Nixon Administration to American dealings with Peking.38 By this formula, the United States 
sought to draw close enough to the PRC to satisfy its grand strategy objectives and avoid having 
to make dramatic concessions at the expense of its allies. To borrow Nixon’s terminology, the 
United States would be “enigmatic” on the nature of its commitments to Taiwan, all while 
attempting to find common ground with Peking on the objectives of grand strategy. As a whole, 
the Nixon Administration’s interactions with the PRC sought to emphasize common geopolitical 
concerns over issues like the 1954 defense pact with Taiwan. Future presidential administrations 
adopted these precepts within the US-ROC-PRC triangle, a construct whose roots can be traced 
back to the era in which Nixon and Kissinger ruled American foreign policy. 
Chapter I of this study deals with the strategic context which the Nixon Administration 
faced as it sought a new direction in its China policy. While breaking with early Cold War 
thinking that Peking represented an untenable enemy, US policymakers grappled with preserving 
American credibility engendered by pre-Nixon alliances like those with Taiwan. Chapter II 
examines the practical difficulties which the Administration faced in the preparation for and 
aftermath of the Kissinger-Chou summit of 1971. After years spent theorizing about the 
implications of the US-ROC alliance vis a vis the opening of the PRC, Washington now faced 
 
38 Note: This term is attributed to Henry Kissinger, particularly within the context of the status of American relations with 
Taiwan, see Representative Sherrod Brown (OH), “One China Policy.” Congressional Record Vol. 142, No. 77, May 30, 1996. 
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the burden of making meaningful adjustments to accommodate its old friend and win over a 
potential partner. Chapter III examines the crafting of the Shanghai Communique and the ways 
in which it affected the US-ROC relationship for the duration of the Nixon Administration. 
While moving towards full diplomatic relations with the PRC, Washington searched for a 






















Chapter 1: Taiwan and Nixon’s Asia 
In 1969, the United States began withdrawing its direct troop presence in Asia under the 
auspices of the Nixon Doctrine. To fill this void, Washington sought to bolster its regional allies 
with material aid and reassurances that it would continue to uphold its treaty commitments to 
them. In order for this strategy to work, however, Nixon would have to diplomatically neutralize 
the threat which Communist China posed to the region. In parallel, the diplomatic overtures to 
Peking and American troop withdrawals from East Asia would directly affect Taiwan’s security 
against the existential threat posed by the PRC. At this stage of outreach to Peking, the Nixon 
Administration sought a middle ground between breaking Communist China’s fears of 
encirclement while not abandoning the allies which had kept Peking in check for the past two 
decades. As it was apparent to Washington, Taiwan would likely be the PRC’s first target if the 
United States appeared to be slackening on its commitments to its Asian partners. 
The stalemate of the Korean War pushed the administration of President Dwight 
Eisenhower to sign a mutual defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954. Fearful of further PRC 
expansion into other parts of ‘free Asia,’ Washington believed that an alliance with Taiwan 
would deter Peking’s stated intentions to ‘liberate’ the island. Article V of the 1954 MDA was 
the binding provision behind this treaty, which stated that should Taiwan be attacked by an 
outside power, the United States would intervene on its behalf.40 The defense agreement 
extended to a peacetime context as well, as the treaty gave both parties the right to station troops 
on each other’s territory.41 While Taiwan had little use for stationing its troops in the United 
 
40 “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and Republic of China,” December 2, 1954. Avalon Project - Mutual 
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States, the United States took full advantage of the important military position which its island 
ally provided. Though this treaty was not the sole factor in underwriting US-ROC security ties, it 
nevertheless remained an important one in the face of Peking’s aggressive designs against the 
island.  
Twenty years after the treaty was signed, the United States’ presence on Taiwan had 
grown remarkably. The US maintained a number of bases on the island, with the most important 
ones being Taipei Air Station, Shu Linkou Air Station, Tainan Air Base, Tsoying Naval Base, 
and Kaohsiung Naval Base.42 American-operated airfields on the island were of particular use for 
U-2 spy plane flights over mainland China, which continued to feed Washington with greater 
details about the PRC’s burgeoning nuclear program.43 Additionally, the fighter group stationed 
at Tainan Airbase housed a number of nuclear armed F-4 Phantom jets, which acted to prop up 
the American nuclear deterrence strategy in the Far East.44 Taiwan’s many air and naval bases 
likewise provided crucial support for the ongoing American conflict in Indochina, being used 
both for supply purposes and bombing sorties.45 The US troop presence on the island also 
included the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Taiwan. Much like its more well-
known counterpart in South Vietnam, the purpose of the MAAG stationed there was to provide 
logistics and training to the ROC military, ostensibly for the purpose of fighting off a PRC 
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invasion.46 This objective remained largely the same under Nixon in 1969, and the American 
military presence on Taiwan hardly diminished. With 9,243 men on the island assigned to 
service in MAAG or Indochina, the US garrison was the largest it had ever been.47 Thus, General 
Douglas MacArthur’s 1950 remark that Taiwan represented “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” 
carried the same weight in the 1970s.48 
New Agendas  
Given the depth of the aforementioned security ties between the US and ROC, Taipei was 
very sensitive to any sort of alteration to the American presence in East Asia. Such a shift came 
in 1969, when President Nixon delivered his famous ‘Guam Speech.’ Stopping on the island of 
Guam during a diplomatic tour of Asia, Nixon delivered what was intended to be an informal 
press conference to a group of reporters. The statements he made over the course of this briefing 
were not yet part of a larger strategic plan for East Asia, but represented the overall ethos of his 
administration.49 Throughout the speech, Nixon emphasized the need for continued defense ties 
with its Asian allies, both in the sense of honoring treaty commitments and furnishing them with 
defense materiel. However, he also affirmed that “except for the threat of a major power 
involving nuclear weapons...the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that 
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this problem [of military defense] will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian 
nations themselves.”50 Simply put, the Nixon Administration was committing itself to the 
avoidance of ‘another Vietnam’.51  
This speech laid the groundwork for what came to be termed ‘the Nixon Doctrine’. 
Domestically, Nixon’s sweeping pronouncements in his press conference won him a great degree 
of clout, both from an American public which largely opposed the ongoing Vietnam War and a 
foreign policy apparatus whose resources had been exhausted by it.52 The generalities of the 
Guam Speech became formalized as a presidential doctrine later that year, wherein Nixon laid 
out his formula for the American presence in East Asia. First, he affirmed that the United States 
would keep all its treaty commitments, specifically those related to mutual defense, which 
included SEATO and NATO.53 Second, it would “provide a shield” to any nation whose security 
was threatened by another nuclear-armed state, should that country under threat be deemed vital 
to US national security.54 Third, the United States would provide whatever material aid it could 
to countries whose immediate security was threatened by an outside (read: communist) 
aggressor.55 Within the context of the larger Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine represented a 
departure from the direct troop commitments of the Kennedy-Johnson era and the nuclear 
deterrence focus of the Eisenhower Administration. The United States was now taking a 
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decidedly more low-profile approach to its presence in East Asia while supporting its allies from 
a greater distance.  
Though not mentioned by name in Nixon’s pronouncements on Guam or in his 
November address, Taiwan was subject to each of the Doctrine’s three tenets. By virtue of the 
commitments outlined in the 1954 MDA and the threat posed to it by the nuclear-armed PRC, 
the ROC fell within the purview of Nixon’s new strategy for East Asia. Taiwan should have felt 
reassured by the American re-affirmation of its treaty obligations, but some of its politicians 
feared that even a lower US presence in the region bode ill for their national security. Indeed, as 
American diplomats summarized, Nixon’s new approach to Asian security was causing “a 
certain adverse reaction” among policymakers in Taipei.56 President Chiang Kai-shek indicated 
that while he would support Nixon’s plan in principle, he conveyed via an intermediary that he 
was concerned about its implementation.57 Specifically, Chiang feared that the decreased 
American troop presence in East Asia could invite the PRC to behave more assertively. In one 
letter to President Nixon, the Generalissimo “declar[ed] that he supports the Nixon Doctrine, but 
adds that this should mean strengthening the free nations against aggression, and by inference, 
not giving in to the Chinese Communists.”58  
At the heart of these comments was Nationalist apprehension about American neglect of 
Taiwan’s security, or worse, a potential sellout of it. As the CIA summarized, “the Republic of 
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China believes the 1970s will be a crucial period in its history. Taipei views its declining support 
abroad, together with recent shifts in US Asian policy, as a growing threat to Nationalist 
interests.”59 This “declining support abroad” was in reference to the growing trend of Taipei’s 
de-recognition as the legitimate Chinese government, and the slow international acceptance of 
Peking as the ‘one true China.’ For Taiwan, this declining political legitimacy abroad went hand-
in-hand with the prospect of a sudden ‘reclamation’ of the island by the PRC.60 With the United 
States being the ROC’s last great-power friend, Taipei was watching the Nixon Doctrine’s 
execution closely for any further disturbances in the status quo. 
The international stage was not the only source of anxiety for many Taiwanese politicians 
at the beginning of the 1970’s. Chief among these fixations was the question over the country’s 
presidential succession. It was common knowledge that President Chiang Kai-shek was very ill, 
and he could no longer exert the same authority over the KMT that he once had. His designated 
heir was his son, Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, who was also head of Taiwan’s secret police. 
While the younger Chiang had the backing of powerful institutions within the ROC, the actual 
succession process could theoretically set off a leadership crisis. Historically, the KMT was 
already prone to infighting, and the departure of the Generalissimo from the scene would only 
aggravate this.61 US intelligence identified ROC Vice President Chen Cheng as one of Ching-
kuo’s potential challengers, and the fear was that he could potentially usurp the presidency for 
his own ends.62 This degree of  political instability on Taiwan played right into the PRC’s hand, 
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as Peking could capitalize on the confusion created by such a crisis, possibly prompting military 
action against the island.  
 The question of a stable transition of power after the Generalissimo fed into fears about 
the political loyalties of the island’s native population. When the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, 
the ruling cadre found themselves as a mainlander (wàishěngrén) party ruling over a population 
of ethnic Taiwanese people. For the most part, the Taiwanese viewed the Nationalists as an 
occupying government which had been grafted onto their island.63 Consequently, they did not 
view Chiang’s government as legitimate, much less share his aspirations for a future retaking of 
the Chinese mainland.64 This sentiment took the form of the native-dominated Taiwan 
Independence Movement, whose adherents supported the idea that Taiwan belonged to neither 
Communist China nor Nationalist China, and was an entirely separate entity from the two. The 
Taiwanese made up 85 percent of the island’s population, and the CIA reported that if given the 
opportunity, this group would likely vote the KMT out of power.65 Such a move would not only 
oust the US-allied Chiang loyalists, but possibly result in Taiwan formally declaring 
independence, which would provoke Peking to invade. The concern over the independence 
movement’s volatility grew in degree especially after one of its members, Peter Huang, 
attempted to kill Ching-kuo outside of the Plaza Hotel in New York on April 25 in 1970.66  
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Hostility to this movement was one of the few issues on which Washington, Peking, and Taipei 
could agree on.  
Another source of concern for the ROC was its budget, which was “already 
overstrained,” as its spending was disproportionately focused on the military.67 While the United 
States supported Taiwan’s purchasing of foreign arms by providing Taipei with lines of credit 
and unconditional aid, Washington also feared that such spending was “imposing an increasing 
burden on its economic development” and “could in fact seriously damage [the] GRC base [of 
support] on Taiwan.”68 As defense chewed up more of the national budget, it was detracting 
from the country’s ability to subsidize sectors of its economy necessary for continued growth. In 
light of Taiwan’s international circumstances, this spending trap could place the country on a 
downward financial spiral. With the threat posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the 
mainland, it was imperative that Taiwan maintain its high defense spending, but in the long term, 
both Washington and Taipei were unsure of how long the ROC could maintain it.  
Considering these sources of anxiety going into the 1970s, Taiwan was apprehensive 
about the signals that its closest ally was sending. Already reeling from a spate of de-
recognitions and uncertain about its prospects for domestic stability, the last thing Taipei wanted 
was for the Nixon Administration to start reconsidering its defense posture in East Asia. 
Meanwhile, Peking, having just emerged from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and in the 
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midst of a border standoff with the Soviet Union, appeared to Taiwan to be just as unpredictable 
and threatening as ever.  
The ‘Other China’ 
Allies like the ROC were not the only variable affected by the new American strategy for 
East Asia. In fact, an implicit goal of the Nixon Doctrine was to reduce its apparent military 
pressure against the PRC. According to the State Department, troop reductions pursuant to the 
Doctrine were “intended to make clear to the Chinese that we do not seek a permanent military 
presence on the Asian mainland and that China can best ease her own security worries over U.S. 
‘encirclement.’”69 The National Security Council (NSC) echoed this same point, stating that 
direct troop reductions would “allay Peking’s fears of US-Soviet collusion against and 
encirclement of China.”70 In Nixon’s words, American military posture in the region had to 
change in character from “potential offense” to “active defense.”71 Troop reductions would 
signal to Peking that Washington no longer viewed the PRC as an adversary to be contained, 
opening the possibility for improved diplomatic ties, which would in turn, allow the United 
States to further reduce its foreign garrisons.  
American policymakers had good reason to want an opening to the PRC. With the 
existing Sino-Soviet rift deepening, the Nixon Administration saw the opportunity to drive a 
diplomatic wedge between Peking and Moscow. Cultivating better relations with one state was 
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bound to give America greater diplomatic leverage over the other, or so the logic went.72 As 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger characterized it, the United States needed to engineer 
“a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Peking, and Moscow” which would 
“improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options towards 
both.”73 The PRC’s growth in GDP and military might since 1949 meant that playing the ‘China 
card’ would give the United States the opportunity to create a tripolar balance of power. The 
stakes were high, and price appeared to be Taiwan.  
Since 1955, the informal negotiations between the United States and PRC had been 
hamstrung by American recognition of the ROC and its parallel defense commitments to it.74 
Peking’s hard line throughout these interactions was that high level US-PRC talks could only 
come after the “abrogation of all treaties [and] agreements with KMT” and the “complete 
withdrawal [of] all US naval military forces from China and Chinese waters, including 
Taiwan.”75 Derecognizing Taiwan was not just the price for full diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Peking, but a prerequisite for the Communists to even consider the Nixon 
Administration’s proposition in the first place.76 This being the case, the US and PRC confined 
their talks to a rank below the diplomatic level, using ‘people to people’ contacts to bridge the 
gap between them. 
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Lacking formal diplomatic relations meant that the Nixon Administration continued to 
rely on unofficial ‘backchannels’ to Peking that its predecessors had established.77 In particular, 
the US diplomatic mission in Poland- colloquially called the ‘Warsaw Channel’- served as an 
important avenue to the PRC which the Administration had inherited from the Johnson years.78 
Since Nixon took office, US and Chinese officials had held 134 meetings through this route, 
nearly all of which got bogged down over the American treaty commitments to Taiwan.79 
Hoping to break the deadlock, Nixon indicated to Kissinger that he wanted to “plant the idea” 
that his administration was open to “exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese” 
via the Warsaw Channel.80 The PRC’s Polish delegation proved receptive to the idea of 
negotiations with the Administration, and agreed to a meeting scheduled for February 20th that 
year.81 On February 11th, Kissinger relayed the agenda for the meeting to Nixon, writing that 
“the Warsaw talks offer an opportunity to shift the focus of our policy...seeking a modus vivendi 
with the Communist Chinese which provides greater stability for East Asia... without abandoning 
our commitment to Taiwan or undermining its position.”82 Moreover, the National Security 
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Advisor stated that the United States should push the idea of “peaceful coexistence” to Peking as 
a means of settling its animosity towards the ROC.83  
However, Peking scuttled the Nixon Administration’s plans for this important meeting in 
the wake of a relatively minor diplomatic spat. Earlier that year, the Chinese Charge d’ Affairs in 
the Netherlands, Liao Ho-shu, defected to the United States.84 With the February 20th meeting 
looming, Peking now demanded him back. As the highest-ranking PRC diplomat to defect to the 
West, the Administration was reluctant to hand over the diplomat, but by declining to return 
Liao, the United States drastically misread the situation. On February 18th, the PRC abruptly 
called off the Warsaw meeting in retaliation.85 The American Ambassador to Poland (and 
Washington’s point man for the Warsaw Channel), Walter J. Stoessel, remarked grimly that the 
Administration ought to be prepared “for [a] prolonged suspension of Warsaw meetings.”86 The 
Warsaw Channel was frozen, and no further US-PRC breakthroughs on the Taiwan issue were 
envisioned for the foreseeable future. In response to the seemingly dead backchannel in Poland, 
the Nixon Administration continued to probe for other diplomatic routes to Peking. To do this, it 
found willing partners in President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and Ambassador Yahya Khan 
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of Pakistan, both of which were mutually friendly to the United States and PRC.87 Through these 
intermediaries, the Administration hoped to make another attempt at breaching the China wall.  
Rapprochement Redux  
It took the Soviet Union to inadvertently rescue US-PRC rapprochement. On March 2, 
the PLA and the Red Army clashed over the disputed Zhenbao Island in Xinjiang Province. 
Amid the skirmishes, the Chairman convened several of his most trusted advisors on the 
possibility of “play[ing] the American card in case of a large-scale Soviet attack on China.”88 To 
this end, Marshal Chen Yi suggested the need for a departure from the dogmatic principles that 
were stifling better US-PRC relations. Breaking precedent, he advised Mao that the PRC should 
not raise the annulment of US-ROC ties as a prerequisite to the resumption of talks between 
Washington and Peking.89 While stating that that issue should be resolved at higher levels of 
diplomatic exchange, Chen still argued that the PRC should not alter its plan to one day ‘liberate’ 
Taiwan, either through diplomatic or military means.90 Mao was receptive to this proposal, 
seeing it as the impetus for a partnership with the United States. With his country seemingly 
surrounded by hostile neighbors like the Soviet Union, India, and Japan, the Chairman mused 
that the PRC must negotiate with countries which were far “while fighting those that are near.”91 
Diplomacy with the United States was thus back on the table. 
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Renewed PRC interest in talks with the Nixon Administration coincided with US efforts 
to revive the Warsaw Channel after the Liao incident. What American policymakers believed 
they needed to do was send a signal to Peking without appearing to lose face internationally. To 
this end, Washington made a considerable gamble in its relationship with the PRC and ROC. 
Since 1950, the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet had run patrols of the Taiwan Strait, which President 
Harry Truman deemed necessary to the “neutralization” of the waterway.92 Now, in 1969, the 
financial cost associated with maintaining the patrol was greater than apparent the security it 
afforded to Taiwan. In connection with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird’s plan to reduce US 
military spending, the Pentagon saw fit to eliminate the costly strait patrol.93 Though done for 
budgetary reasons, this decision could easily have been misconstrued by the ROC as a softening 
of the US defense commitment, and the Nixon Administration moved quickly to assuage this 
fear. For one, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson conveyed in a telegram to the US 
Taiwan Defense Command that this “modification [of the patrol] carries no implication whatever 
of any change in US defense commitment or in ability of Seventh Fleet to perform [the] mission 
contemplated for it under Mutual Defense Treaty.”94 The US ambassador to Taiwan, Walter 
McConaughy, carried the same point to Chiang directly at a meeting later that year. He assured 
the Generalissimo that the “alteration in the orders to individual ships of the Seventh Fleet were 
dictated purely by reasons of economy,” and there had been no change to the terms of the 
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MDA.95 The Nixon Administration also believed that given the high quantity of US naval and air 
assets on Taiwan in 1969, the patrol had essentially been relegated to a symbolic role anyway.96 
The Administration, however, did not want to lose the symbolic power afforded by this 
cut. National Security Council staff member John Holderige sent a memorandum to Kissinger 
stating that the State Department was “thinking of using the elimination of the Taiwan Strait 
patrol as a lever to encourage the [Communist] Chinese who wish to reopen the Warsaw talks.”97 
Kissinger saw value in this move, and became convinced that in connecting the two issues, the 
PRC could be compelled to come back to negotiations. At Secretary of State William Rogers’ 
direction, US diplomats began selectively ‘leaking’ this information to PRC officials, while 
Kissinger used his connection with President Khan of Pakistan to pass the same message to 
Premier Chou En-lai in Peking.98  As a qualifier, the National Security Adviser’s message made 
it clear to the Communists that such a move did not indicate a softening of the US-ROC defense 
relationship.99 Despite the addendum, PRC officials appeared pleased by the gesture, and Chou 
advised Chairman Mao that they ought to “pay attention to Nixon's and Kissinger's inclinations” 
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going forward.100 To Peking, the discontinuation of the patrol seemed to be a signal that the 
United States wanted to make another attempt at negotiation. 
With Taipei mollified and Peking in the loop, the Nixon Administration now looked to a 
resumption of the talks in Warsaw. They again placed Stoessel at the head of this mission, and 
instructed him to contact Lei Yang, the PRC Charge ‘d Affairs for Poland. Strangely enough, the 
two men finally ran into one another during a Yugoslav fashion show hosted at the Palace of 
Culture in Warsaw, rather than at an official meeting.101 Stoessel and Lei then agreed to resume 
their backchannel discussions, and arranged for the 135th US-PRC meeting to take place on 
January 20th, 1970 at Peking’s Polish embassy. Just before the talks, Secretary Rogers sent the 
President a memorandum outlining the American positions for the January 20th meeting. In it, he 
stressed three points which became the standard operating procedure for addressing US-ROC 
relations during talks with the PRC. First, “the U.S. does not seek to impose its views concerning 
Taiwan on either side and does not intend to interfere in whatever settlement may be reached.”102 
Second, the United States would affirm “a strengthened commitment not to support a GRC 
offensive action against the mainland.”103 And finally, proceeding from the tenets of the Nixon 
Doctrine, the Administration hoped that “we can reduce U.S. military presence on Taiwan as 
peace and stability in Asia grows.”104 This was, in effect, the three tactical commitments which 
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stemmed from Kissinger’s prior plan to promote ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the PRC and 
ROC.  
When the January 20th meeting finally arrived, the Nixon Administration got a second 
chance at the backchannel opening it had fumbled almost exactly a year prior. The Stoessel-Lei 
talks began with the usual exchange of diplomatic niceties, with both sides exchanging 
concurrent views about the need for greater US-PRC negotiations. However, it was inevitable for 
the two diplomats to address the Nationalist elephant in the room. Stoessel stressed the three 
ROC guidelines which Rogers had given him, but clarified that in any case, “the United States 
will continue to maintain its friendly relations with the Government in Taipei and honor its 
commitment to that Government to assist it in defending Taiwan and the Pescadores from 
military attack.”105 The Administration was willing to reduce its troop presence on the island, yet 
such a drawdown would only occur in the event that the PRC took steps to reduce tensions 
between itself and the ROC.106 Lei found these terms to be unacceptable. American forces were 
occupying rightful Chinese land, he argued, as Taiwan was “an inalienable part of [Communist] 
China’s territory.”107 He grew irate with Stoessel’s formulation that the United States was bound 
by treaty to defend the “Chiang clique,” and informed him that no meaningful progress was 
possible until the United States withdrew its troops and annulled the 1954 MDA.108 Though 
productive in the area of setting the stage for greater US-PRC governmental contacts, the 
January 20th meeting produced no meaningful changes in Peking’s attitude towards the Taiwan 
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issue. Stoessel reported back to Rogers that this was to be expected, as “any expectation that 
Peking’s position on this would change was fruitless.”109 The PRC maintained the position that 
Taiwan remained an internal issue to be settled, and its liberation would come through whatever 
means they deemed necessary.  
Stoessel’s second meeting with Lei on February 20th carried a more conciliatory tone 
than that which had occurred on January 20th. According to Stoessel, the PRC Charge d’ Affairs 
had emphasized two major points: the “primacy of Taiwan issue and [Communist] Chinese 
interest in [a] higher level meeting.”110 Lei took these two points to be convergent, and stated 
that ‘progress’ on the Taiwan issue would lead to a “fundamental improvement in Sino-US 
relations.”111 This seemed to be a step in the right direction, but it was implicitly an attempt to 
wring appeasement from Washington. By placing the onus on the Americans to lower the tension 
in the area, Lei hoped to get Washington to give concessions before Peking was forced to. 
Stoessel, meanwhile, reiterated that it was imperative for the PRC to take equal steps in this 
direction. In the long term, it was the American goal to “reduce those military facilities which we 
now have on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminish.”112  
The talks between Stoessel and Lei hit upon one of the major philosophical differences in 
negotiating strategies between Washington and Peking. Heavily influenced by Kissinger’s 
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strategy of ‘linkage,’ US diplomats often tried to focus on a broad spectrum of issues to be 
discussed with the PRC, bundling together matters such as trade, the US-PRC-USSR triangle, 
and the wars in Indochina.113 Focusing on a plethora of ‘big picture’ issues often made it easier 
to shirk certain tactical ones like those of Taiwan. For Peking, however, Taiwan was not one 
issue among many to be discussed with the United States, but the main rift between the two 
countries. To the PRC, talking grand strategy before settling such immediate differences was 
akin to putting the cart before the horse. 
 Taking this view into consideration, the Nixon Administration realized it would need to 
begin considering a new outlook on its rigid Taiwan policy. In response to the Warsaw talks, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green laid out the 
approach for the future US position on Taiwan when dealing with the PRC. First, he affirmed 
that the end goal of the negotiations would be to encourage a peaceful resolution of the PRC-
ROC dispute over the island. Second, the United States would not interfere in such a settlement, 
so long as it were done without military aggression. Third, America would reiterate its desire for 
the progressive reduction of forces on Taiwan as tensions diminished.114 Such an approach 
maintained US-ROC defense ties while not prejudicing a PRC-ROC modus vivendi.  
Though negotiations hit an impasse on the Taiwan issue when the February 20th meeting 
concluded, Lei’s suggestion of upgraded contacts between Washington and Peking was great 
news. In standing resolute on the US-ROC defense commitment, the Nixon Administration 
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appeared to have forced Peking’s hand on discussing bilateral issues at a higher level. While 
Stoessel was only in a position to convey American policy, Lei’s higher-ups knew that to go any 
further, they would need to interface with someone closer to the Presidency.  
Growing Pains 
It did not take long for news of this meeting and its details to leak to the press. When 
President Chiang was informed that Taiwan had even been the subject of discussion between 
Stoessel and Lei, he was shocked. In a strongly worded letter to President Nixon, the ROC leader 
stated that any compromise with the PRC on the Taiwan issue was blatantly “infringing on the 
sovereign rights of the Republic of China.”115 However sharp, Kissinger stated that this reaction 
was predictable. As the National Security Advisor observed, Chiang’s letter “illustrated the deep 
concern which he and others like him in Taiwan undoubtedly feel with respect to the possible 
indications of the Warsaw talks.”116 To conclude, he advised Nixon to write a letter to Chiang in 
which “our continued commitment to the Republic of China is re-emphasized.”117  
 The response generated by the mere discussion of Taiwan in US-PRC talks served as a 
reminder of how closely the ROC watched dealings between Washington and Peking. Combined 
with what unfolded in Warsaw, Chiang was equally worried about the way in which the Nixon 
Administration seemed to be cutting back its means to uphold their defense relationship. The 
promised drawdown of American forces on Taiwan was proceeding apace, with US forces on the 
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island down from 9,243 to 8,813, in part due to the drawdown of troops in Indochina.118 The 
Generalissimo also found the decreased American military aid provided through the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) to be a point of anxiety.119  According to one report, MAP funds for 
the ROC were down from $55,336,000 in 1969 to $37,865,000 in 1970.120  Going by numbers 
alone, it appeared that the US was choking off a vital lifeline for the ROC military.  
During one meeting, Chiang Ching-kuo confronted Kissinger about these developments, 
stating that because of the cuts, “confidence in US consistency and dependability had been 
seriously diluted in all sectors [of Taiwan’s] government.”121 The National Security Advisor then 
moved to clarify the American position. Washington, he said, was in the midst of cutting defense 
expenditures while also allocating funds for an overhaul of the Cambodian military.122 Cuts had 
not come from a sidelining of Taipei’s interests, but wholly from budgetary constraints. With 
Taiwan’s massive growth in GDP (bankrolled in large part by American aid and investment), 
Kissinger stated that the ROC was now in a position to buy weapons rather than receive them 
sine condicione.123 MAP funds were diminishing, but the United States was still more than 
willing to furnish defense articles on credit to Taiwan through its Foreign Military Sales program 
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(FMS). In point of fact, between 1969 and 1970 alone, US arms sales to the ROC had more than 
doubled from $13,528,000 to $36,528,000.124 At the conclusion of the meeting, Kissinger again 
reaffirmed Washington’s “intention to uphold the international position of the GRC and to carry 
out all of our [treaty] commitments” to Ching-kuo.125 In a subsequent talk with ROC Vice 
President Yen Chia-kan, President Nixon also attempted to calm Taiwan’s fears of military 
abandonment, remarking that he would fight in Congress for greater aid to be allocated for 
Taipei.126 For the purposes of maintaining the Nixon Doctrine, the United States would adhere to 
its plan of modernizing Taiwan’s armed forces, particularly its air force and navy, to defend 
against a PRC incursion.127 Still, the shock had been dealt. The US-ROC defense treaty remained 
unaltered, but even so, the MAP cuts indicated that the patron-client relationship between the 
two was changing. From the Nixon Administration’s perspective, Taiwan had become a 
“graduate” from many of the programs intended to prop up the defense of its third world 
allies.128 The ROC, meanwhile, was struggling to adapt to this new set of growing pains.  
With the next round of the Stoessel-Lei talks slated to take place in March of 1970, 
Nixon felt it prudent to send a letter to Chiang regarding the nature of deepening US-PRC 
negotiations. In doing so, the President hoped to avoid a repeat of some of the Administration’s 
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past blunders where it had caught Taipei off guard. Nixon stated that while he knew of Chiang’s 
“deep distrust” towards Mao’s regime, the American president said he would be “remiss in my 
duty to the American people if I did not attempt to discover whether a basis may not exist for 
reducing the risk of a conflict between the United States and Communist China.”129 Such 
dialogue, he affirmed, would not come at the expense of Taiwan’s security, and as had become 
tradition at this point, he restated that “there shall be no change in the firmness of our 
commitment to the defense of Taiwan.”130 However lofty the President’s goals were for the next 
Warsaw meeting, none would come to pass. The US-PRC talks hit yet another snag. 
In mid-1970, the Nixon Administration again committed an act of self-sabotage in its 
opening to the PRC. Notwithstanding efforts to ‘Vietnamize’ the war in Indochina, the United 
States found itself again escalating the war there, this time with an incursion into Cambodia. On 
April 29, President Nixon ordered US troops into the country, aiming to hit enemy supply sites 
and, hopefully, to destroy the theorized headquarters of the Viet Cong, COSVN.131 Peking was 
outraged at this act of aggression against its fellow Asian communists. Reflecting the Chinese 
Politburo’s general views, the CCP’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily, summarily decried the “naked 
gangster logic of US imperialism,” which it claimed was once more on display in Cambodia.132 
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Just as it had handled the Liao defection in 1969, the PRC cancelled the Warsaw talks as 
punishment- this time, for good. 
Across the strait, Taiwan observed the escalation in Indochina with unease. From the 
outset of American involvement in the region, Chiang doubted the US ability to wage a 
successful war in Indochina.133 The incursion into Cambodia only confirmed this outlook. 
Indeed, a CIA report gauging the reactions of the US’s East Asian allies found that politicians in 
Taipei believed the United States to be “fighting the wrong opponent in the wrong way in the 
wrong place.”134 Nevertheless, Chiang was a strong supporter of Cambodia’s right-wing leader, 
Lon Nol, and believed it to be vital for the general’s anticommunist regime to survive against the 
PRC-backed Viet Cong and Khmer Rouge.135 It was not surprising, therefore, that official KMT 
news outlets began to pitch the conflict in markedly similar terms to America’s ‘domino theory’ 
of communism. The party-run Taiwanese newspaper, Chung Hua Jih Pao, stated in alarmist 
terms that “the defeatists think it realistic to surrender part of Cambodia to the Communists. 
They let the Communists have northern Korea, northern Vietnam and even mainland China. 
Such realism led to war in Korea and Vietnam. Now it is leading toward a conflict that would be 
both global and nuclear.”136 Feeling its security to be interlocked with Cambodia’s, Taipei 
evidently believed it was imperative to participate in a more active role in the wars in Indochina. 
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Though ROC forces had already been involved in Indochina through their support role in 
the Free World Military Forces (FWMF), the United States now probed the possibility of using 
KMT troops in Vietnam.137 However, this plan was ditched not long thereafter, as the presence 
of Taiwan’s forces so close to the PRC could provoke the Communists into “overt troop and 
aircraft deployments to coastal areas opposite Taiwan; harassment of [ROC] air and sea units in 
the Taiwan Strait area; and shelling of the Offshore Islands.”138 Tensions between the US and 
PRC were already surging, and the Nixon Administration did not want to provoke another 
standoff in the Taiwan Strait in exchange for Nationalist troops.  
By July, the Nixon Administration had retracted its troops from eastern Cambodia with 
comparatively little to show for it. Though the US military managed to interdict several Viet 
Cong supply lines, the ‘bamboo Pentagon’ of COSVN continued to elude discovery.139 The cost, 
unfortunately for Washington, was the negotiations it had worked tirelessly to set up with the 
PRC. With the Warsaw Channel dead, the Nixon Administration came to rely even more heavily 
on the aid of Ceausescu and Khan to relay information to Peking.140  
Aside from the aggravation posed by the US attacks into Cambodia, factors inside the 
PRC also contributed to the deterioration of relations between Washington and Peking. Mao’s 
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Cultural Revolution had severely worsened fractures within the 9th CCP Politburo, which led to 
an open split between so called ‘moderates’ led by Premier Chou En-lai and ‘radicals’ led by 
Marshal Lin Piao.141 Following the border conflict with the Soviet Union and the American 
overtures to Peking, this division began to center around the direction of the PRC’s foreign 
policy. Chou’s group favored improved relations with the United States, whereas Lin’s loyalists 
emphasized a “go-it-alone” foreign policy independent from Moscow and Washington.142 
Following the American invasion of Cambodia, Lin’s faction gained ascendancy, and took full 
advantage of the polemical opportunities it afforded. In one speech, the marshal vocally 
expressed his faction’s views declaring that the PRC must “firmly support the peoples of 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.”143 
Given the circumstances, Chou’s pragmatism appeared to many in the CCP to be appeasement 
rather than realism.  
The split between the Chou and Lin groups was informed to an equal degree by their 
divergent views on how to handle the Taiwan question. Though both men were staunch 
advocates of the island’s eventual annexation, they differed markedly in their plans on how to do 
it. Chou was of the opinion that the PRC could leverage the United States into annulling the 1954 
MDA, derecognizing the ROC, and then withdrawing its troops, paving the way for the 
liberation of Taiwan, ideally through “peaceful means.”144 As an officer of the PLA, Lin took a 
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different stance. While Chou had stressed the need for a conciliatory approach which would first 
negotiate away the US presence on the island, the marshal’s designs were decidedly warlike. In 
one speech decrying American and Soviet imperialism, he boldly proclaimed that “the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army are determined to liberate their sacred territory Taiwan and resolutely, 
thoroughly, wholly, and completely wipe out all aggressors who dare to come!”145 Obliquely  
referencing the likely US response to such an attack, Lin believed that the “invincible” PLA 
could fend off any American efforts to uphold its defense commitment to Taiwan.146 Naturally, 
the friction generated in the party by these two competing worldviews considerably slowed 
Peking’s foreign policy in 1970. For a considerable portion of the year, US-PRC dialogue 
remained frozen. 
Once More Unto Peking 
Kissinger’s Pakistani Channel proved the most valuable diplomatic asset in salvaging 
US-PRC relations.147 Aside from allowing the Presidency and the National Security Council 
more control over the content of US-PRC relations, it also allowed for a degree of secrecy which 
prevented possible ROC interference in negotiations. In December of 1970, Kissinger passed a 
message dubbed the ‘Communist China Initiative’ to Pakistan’s president, Yahya Khan, which 
the National Security Advisor in turn, asked him to deliver to Chou En-lai. The communique 
aimed to paper over the differences which the Cambodia incident had exacerbated, and indicated 
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that the United States was still interested in carrying out “a higher-level meeting in Peking.”148 
Regarding the Taiwan question, Kissinger’s message stated that while the US desired to “reduce 
progressively its military presence” on the island, he re-affirmed that this would not be the only 
item on the agenda.149 In so doing, he aimed to pre-emptively neutralize the possibility of having 
to take more dramatic steps in altering the US-ROC defense relationship. Somewhat 
disingenuously, Kissinger’s message ignored the stipulation of Lei’s February 20th, 1970 
invitation that the high-level talks in Peking deal exclusively with the Taiwan issue.150  
By the time that Peking received Kissinger’s message, the situation within the CCP had 
changed a fair bit. The ambitions of Lin and his radical group within the Politburo were 
beginning to alarm Chairman Mao, who now feared that the polemics of his designated successor 
were giving rise to ‘factionalism’ within the Party. As such, he conspired with the moderate 
faction to “launch a surprise attack” against Lin’s ‘ultra-leftists’ beginning at the Party’s Second 
Plenum in August 1970.151 With Chou’s help, Mao managed to politically outmaneuver the 
marshal and cut off his base of support within the Politburo.152 Though Lin had yet to be 
formally purged, by late 1970, he had been removed from many of the state, party, and military 
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posts he once held.153 With the radical faction rapidly losing power over the course of the year, 
Mao and Chou were once again in a position to formulate foreign policy.154 Lin’s anti-American 
position and hawkish stance on Taiwan was left to fall by the wayside. 
On December 9th, Ambassador Hilaly of Pakistan brought Chou’s message of reply to 
Kissinger. To the Nixon Administration’s relief, the Premier was willing to conduct a meeting 
with an envoy from Washington. However, the excitement had to be qualified. The topic of 
discussion, the Premier said, would be largely confined to the Taiwan issue. “Taiwan and the 
Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China have now been occupied by foreign troops of 
the United States for the last fifteen years,” he wrote, “in order to discuss this subject of the 
vacation [sic] of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon’s will be 
most welcome in Peking.”155 Though this line was hardly new, Chou’s letter was an indicator 
that US-PRC rapprochement was not dead in the water.  
In early 1971, the Nixon Administration felt reassured about the possibility to finally 
meet in Peking, either with Mao or Chou. Yet, Peking’s intransigence on the single issue of 
Taiwan still loomed large in the minds of American policymakers. As a result the White House 
commissioned National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 106 to weigh its options. As the 
draft response to the directive laid out, while it was wholly possible to reduce American troop 
presence on the island (pursuant to part of Peking’s demands), annulment of US-ROC defense 
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ties would jeopardize the entire goal of the Nixon Doctrine and, by extension, American grand 
strategy in East Asia.156 NSSM 106 thus tried to find a middle ground between upholding the 
US’s existing alliance and charting a new relationship with Peking. Regarding the ROC, the 
United States should “insure the security of Taiwan from external attack” and “maintain access 
to Taiwan to the extent necessary to meet our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the 
Pescadores and our strategic requirements in East Asia.”157 With regard to the PRC, the directive 
advised that the United States continue to “encourage a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue” 
and “deter PRC aggression against non-communist neighbors.”158 To encapsulate NSSM 106’s 
conclusions, the United States’ role in the PRC-ROC standoff would be one which guaranteed 
peace long enough for a settlement to be reached between Peking and Taipei.  
The draft response to NSSM 106 also outlined a huge shift in the American 
understanding of Taiwan’s status. “We have tried to set aside the Taiwan issue by making clear 
to Peking that we would accept any peaceful resolution by the parties directly concerned,” the 
report read, “this position implies that we would not oppose the peaceful incorporation of 
Taiwan into the mainland. However, we have also made clear to Peking that until a peaceful 
settlement is reached, we intend to maintain our defense commitment to, and continue our 
diplomatic relations with the [ROC].”159 This statement in NSSM 106 challenged two major 
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assumptions which guided US-ROC relations in the early years of the MDA. First, this new 
formulation implied that the United States would not participate in any efforts by Taipei to 
‘reclaim’ the mainland, and second, suggested that Washington would not oppose a Chinese 
solution to the Taiwan dispute. In this context, the MDA served now more as an ‘insurance 
policy’ against a forcible PRC reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland than an effort by 
Washington to sever the ‘two Chinas’. 
To wrap up its analysis, the NSC’s draft response to NSSM 106 laid out five possible 
courses of action regarding the US defense commitment to Taiwan. The Administration could: 
● Maintain the present level of troops on Taiwan 
● Increase the amount of support troops (logistics, intelligence, engineering, etc.) on 
Taiwan 
●  Increase the amount of combat troops on Taiwan 
● Decrease the total US presence on the island unilaterally while maintaining base rights 
there 
● Make further troop withdrawals contingent upon a PRC agreement to renounce force 
against Taiwan while maintaining the terms of the MDA160 
At a Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting, the NSC debated the possible options and their 
potential effects on American foreign policy. ‘Option 2’ and ‘Option 3’ were rejected almost 
immediately, citing the fact that they were at odds with the larger goal of building trust with 
Peking. ‘Option 1,’ meanwhile, was in direct conflict with the withdrawals that were already in 
progress, stemming from the principles of the Nixon Doctrine and the drawdown of American 
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forces in Vietnam.161 Lastly, ‘Option 4’ left Washington appearing too willing to ‘quit Taiwan,’ 
damaging not only US credibility, but also the country’s ability to project power in the Asia-
Pacific region. Thus, ‘Option 5,’ which made American withdrawals contingent on a PRC 
renunciation of force, seemed to be the choice which most preserved US defense ties to the ROC 
and allayed the fears of Peking.162 The United States was already prepared to make withdrawals 
from Taiwan, regardless of whether or not the PRC pressured Washington into doing so. The  
trick, according to Kissinger would be “to extract concessions [from Peking] for changes in 
military deployments that we were going to make anyway.”163 Ultimately, it was the fifth option 
which found the most consensus among those at the SRG meeting, and the group adjourned 
shortly thereafter.  
Though most in the Nixon Administration remained optimistic about the United States’ 
ability to maintain its defense ties to Taiwan and open the PRC, the Department of Defense was 
decidedly more cautious about the means to do it. Though it concurred with the NSC’s idea that 
the MDA should remain in full force as negotiations with Peking continued, it warned against 
moving too fast to appease the Chinese Communists. For instance, rather than using the 
withdrawal of American troops on Taiwan to induce Peking to negotiate, the Pentagon argued 
that pullout should first be “contingent upon PRC willingness to agree to a mutual renunciation 
of force in the Strait area.”164 Aside from serving as a deterrent factor against outside aggression, 
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the Department of Defense pointed out that the troops stationed there served practical strategic 
goals as well, acting to advance American interests in Indochina and Korea. In the long term, the 
Pentagon advised that the United States should continue to build up the ROC’s ability to resist 
future military pressure by the PRC.165 In this sense, it was proposing a model similar to that of 
Secretary Laird’s ‘Vietnamization’ strategy, which he had outlined in 1969 to address the 
situation in Indochina.166 The report from the Department of Defense concluded by stating that, 
for the purposes of upholding the principles of the Nixon Doctrine and the terms of the MDA, 
any further overtures to Peking should be weighed against the risks of degrading security ties 
between the ROC and the United States.167 
With these considerations in mind and Chou’s invitation pending, the Administration 
decided that now was not the time to make any hasty moves. After all, as Nixon had handwritten 
on a memorandum from Kissinger, “I believe we may appear too eager. Let’s cool it.”168 Peking 
had already demonstrated its keen desire for a meeting- keeping the Chairman waiting for a 
moment could, in theory, improve the negotiating terms that Washington was being offered, 
especially regarding Taiwan.169 At present, the Administration resolved to send positive signals 
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in the PRC’s direction which would least affect the defense relationship between the US and 
ROC. In March of 1971, the Administration ended the travel ban which the United States had 
placed on Communist China, allowing for both Chinese and American citizens to visit the 
Mainland for the first time in decades.170 The following month, it also lifted a number of 
embargoes on the PRC related to commercial shipping, currency exchange, and the trade of non-
strategic goods.171 Though Kissinger reasoned that Taipei would (correctly) read these moves as 
an effort by Washington to improve relations with Peking, such dealings would not in any way 
come at the direct expense of Taiwan.172 In a small signal of goodwill, the PRC extended an 
invitation to the American ping-pong team to participate in the 31st annual World Table Tennis 
Championship in Peking on March 28, 1971.173 In spite of the relative innocuousness of this 
invite, the move raised a few eyebrows on Taiwan. “Although the Nationalist Chinese have 
reacted in relatively low key,” a CIA report on the subject read, “Taipei papers are calling 
Peking’s gesture a ‘plot’ and are suggesting that Washington has been bamboozled by clever 
Communist tactics.”174 While not as apparently bold as the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait 
patrol or the re-opening of the Warsaw talks, the exchanges between the US and PRC in the early 
months of 1971 served their purpose. They managed to keep a relatively low profile on the world 
 
170 Tad Szulc, “U.S. Lifts Ban on China Travel,” March 16, 1971, New York Times.  
171 Robert B. Semple, “Nixon Eases China Trade Embargo to Allow Nonstrategic Exports,” April 15, 1971, New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/15/archives/nixon-eases-china-trade-embargo-to-allow-nonstrategic-exports-u-s.html.  
172 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,”  March 25, 
1971, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d111. 
 
173 Public Broadcasting Service, “Ping-Pong Diplomacy,” PBS American Experience, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/china-ping-pong/.  
174 Central Intelligence Agency- Directorate of Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: Ping Pong Diplomacy,” April 19, 1971, 
CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room,  https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r001100100050-0, 1-2. 
52 
 
stage while also improving the value of the ‘people-to-people’ contacts between their two 
countries.  
Then, on April 29, 1971, the Administration received an important message from Chou 
En-lai. On the surface, it was simply another invitation for either the President or one of his 
representatives to pay a visit to Peking. What was crucial about this message was the absence of 
any mention of annulling the US-ROC defense treaty, either as a prerequisite for discussion or as 
the primary focus of a hypothetical meeting. “At present, contacts between the peoples of China 
and the United States are being renewed,” and as such, Chou wanted to extend an invitation to 
President Nixon to visit Peking.175 Additionally, the Premier wanted to arrange a preliminary 
meeting to discuss outstanding issues between the United States and PRC with “a special envoy 
of the President of the U.S.”176 The Administration was very pleased with the results of its delay 
tactic. Per Chou’s suggestion in the telegram, Nixon decided that Kissinger ought to be the 
envoy which Washington sent at this initial round of negotiations.177 On May 10th, the American 
side accepted the PRC’s invitation, conveyed through a message which the President gave to 
Ambassador Hilaly.178 Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking was thus secured. 
The first stages of the American opening to Peking were fraught with troubles stemming 
not only from ideological friction, but more immediately, from the stumbling block posed by 
Taiwan. Despite several misfires, both sides were able to preference the objectives of grand 
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strategy over their tactical points of contention. While the Nixon Administration can be credited 
for its ability to counter Peking’s demands related to the ROC, it was also due to the PRC’s 























Chapter 2: Managing Turbulence 
The dynamics of American containment in East Asia were at a crossroads in 1971. While 
troop deployments of the 1950s and 1960s were scaled back in accordance with the Nixon 
Doctrine, the United States now had a real chance to transform hostile Peking into a partner for 
peace in the region. With this new course more tangible than ever, the Administration had to face 
reality on Taiwan. An invitation to visit the PRC provided the basis for negotiations, but it also 
gave the Communists a chance to extract concessions.  
Indeed, despite the relative absence of Taiwan in Chou’s April 1971 invitation and in 
Nixon’s reply, the Administration was under no illusion that they could avoid addressing the 
topic at the upcoming meeting. While the Premier had seemingly ducked the issue in his April 
29th message, he made clear at a subsequent press conference that “the American military 
presence on Taiwan and in the Taiwan strait area” remained the “key problem between China 
and the US.”179 Accordingly, the Nixon Administration sought to establish some fundamental 
terms on their Taiwan stance before Kissinger’s meeting in Peking. This first meeting would 
essentially be a fact-finding mission for the National Security Advisor, wherein he would attempt 
to gauge the foreign policy attitudes of the PRC.  
The response to NSSM 124 from the NSC’s Interdepartmental Group for East Asia set 
several of these axioms. In terms of basic positions on Taiwan, this study differed little from that 
which NSSM 106 had put forward, operating on the assumption that “there will be no change in 
our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.”180 The 
 
179 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin,” June 24, 1971, 
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00975a019400010001-5,  2. 
180 “Response to National Security Study Memorandum 124, Subject- Next Steps Toward the People’s Republic of China- 




report stated that though the United States should move to emphasize common grand strategy 
objectives with the PRC, but also “intend to continue our policy of recognition of, and support 
for, the [ROC].”181 The formula which the Interdepartmental Group provided for the upcoming 
meeting in Peking was not unlike that which was already in practice during the days of the 
Warsaw talks. It advised that the US negotiating position should be to “put the Taiwan issue 
aside,” but not renege on “insuring [ROC] security from external attack and maintaining 
necessary military access for ourselves.”182  These were the parameters which Kissinger’s 
meeting in the PRC would have to operate within. 
Prior to the National Security Advisor’s trip to Peking, Nixon briefed Kissinger one last 
time. As the President indicated, no part of the negotiations should indicate an American 
willingness to “sell out” Taiwan.183 Moreover, Kissinger’s statements on the ROC should seek to 
skirt the issue, aiming to be “enigmatic” more than concrete.184 On the issue of troop 
deployments, Nixon pointed out that in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, a progressive 
withdrawal of American forces on the island satisfied both US and PRC needs. Troop reductions  
could be expedited, he noted, if the PRC backed off its support for the communists in Indochina 
and took a more conciliatory stance on settling the Taiwan Strait crisis.185 As standard operating 
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procedures dictated, these talks as a whole should seek to deal with regional issues that both 
Washington and Peking could agree on, including the settlement of the Vietnam War, restraining 
a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism, and above all, constraining Soviet designs on East 
Asia.186 Returning to the issue of Taiwan, Nixon told Kissinger that the United States could “not 
appear to be dumping on our friends” and that the American position be “be somewhat more 
mysterious about our overall willingness to make concessions in this area.”187  
On July 1st, 1971 Kissinger and a small entourage embarked on their secret trip, which 
was codenamed POLO I.188 Though it began under the auspices of a diplomatic tour of South 
Asia, the National Security Advisor and his group covertly boarded an airplane to Peking while 
on a stopover in Pakistan. The reason for this diversion, Kissinger recalls, was because a public 
trip “would have set off a complicated internal clearance project within the US government and 
insistent demands for consultations from around the world, including Taiwan.”189 While trying to 
shrug off the restrictions which ROC protestations would have placed on American freedom of 
maneuver, Taipei was still on Kissinger’s mind throughout the trip. In a July 3 scope paper, he 
affirmed that in his talks with PRC negotiators, he would make it clear that as it pertained to 
Taiwan “the US as a great nation simply will not sell out its friends.”190 Though he would 
convey to them the progress that the United States was making in its troop reductions on the 
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island, he would also affirm that the existing defense treaty between Washinton and Taipei was a 
“reality with which both we and the PRC must deal.”191  
Along this line of thinking, he noted that while the United States could be willing to 
withdraw all of its troops from the island some point in the future, this could only be done if 
Peking agreed to moderate its posture in the region. As Kissinger’s logic went, the PRC’s 
aggressive foreign policy was the main reason for the US forces on Taiwan, and as this threat 
abated, there would be no real need for the American military to be directly involved. But, “as 
long as hostilities go on and a threat continues to exist (including a threat in the Taiwan strait),” 
he outlined, “the requirement for US forces to be stationed on Taiwan will remain.”192 For 
Kissinger, US troops on the island could be used as a bargaining chip against Peking, but the 
defense treaty itself would be treated as a given. What he therefore sought to further at this first 
meeting was a “Sino-US modus vivendi on the Taiwan situation which will permit our relations 
with Peking to develop while we at the same time retain our diplomatic ties and mutual defense 
treaty with the ROC."193   
The Kissinger mission arrived in Peking on July 9th, and the group was posted at the 
Diaoyutai Guesthouse, which served as the temporary residence of all high ranking foreign 
envoys visiting the PRC.194 At 4:30 in the afternoon, Chou En-lai and his entourage arrived to 
begin the scheduled meeting, and as was tradition among Chinese diplomats, the Premier 
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allowed the National Security Advisor to speak first.195 After addressing broad points about the 
unprecedented nature of the US-PRC talks, Kissinger got down to business on the issues he 
wanted to discuss with Chou. First on that list was Taiwan. “From the exchange of notes between 
us, we know [that] to be your principal concern in relations between us,” Kissinger commented, 
and regarding the withdrawal of US troops from the island, the National Security Adviser was 
prepared to hear Chou’s views and “discuss the matter practically.”196 The Premier replied that 
he did not fully blame Nixon for the current impasse on the Taiwan issue. Instead, he noted that 
the United States was simply carrying out the terms of Truman and Eishenhower’s past notions 
of containment. Chou then pressed his demands for the current Administration- first, Nixon must 
derecognize Taiwan, then “withdraw all its armed forces and dismantle all its military 
installations on Taiwan,” and abrogate its “illegal” defense treaty with the ROC.197  
Kissinger then attempted a diversionary tactic, wherein he stated that he wished to 
separate the Taiwan issue into two parts for negotiation- being military concerns over the Taiwan 
Strait crisis and secondly, political concerns over which state Washington recognized as the 
‘legitimate China.’198 Chou did not buy the National Security Advisor’s feint. Instead, he pointed 
out that it was not possible from Peking’s perspective to separate these considerations. The 
Premier proposed a singular solution, affirming that “if relations are to be established...the 
United States must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and that 
 
195 Richard Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967-1984, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1995, 61. 
196 “Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou,” July 10, 1971, pg. 5 in The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret 
Trip, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, edited by William Burr, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-35.pdf.   
197   “Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou,” July 10, 1971, pg. 10, in The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s 
Secret Trip, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, edited by William Burr, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-35.pdf/.  
198 “Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou,” July 10, 1971, 11.  
59 
 
Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.”199 From this arrangement, he noted 
that “the US-Chiang Kai-shek Treaty would not exist.”200 The two issues, in Chou’s mind, were 
really a singular one. 
Sensing that he could not move any further on the issue for the moment, Kissinger then 
turned to discussing what moves Peking needed to take in step with efforts by Washington to 
reduce tensions in East Asia.201 He underscored that the United States was already whittling 
down its presence on the island, and that the United States was “prepared to remove that part [of 
our forces] related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan.”202 As he pointed out, two 
thirds of the American troops on the island were serving roles in the Indochina conflict, and as 
the peace process of that war progressed, the need for those garrisons would diminish.Kissinger 
would recall years later, that “we linked Taiwan to the settlement of Vietnam when we linked the 
withdrawal of our troops from Taiwan to the settlement of Vietnam.”203 In a classic 
demonstration of the Nixon-era concept of linkage, the National Security Advisor sought to 
arrange a partial quid pro quo between Washington and Peking. In this connection, the American 
troop presence on Taiwan would serve as leverage to compel the PRC towards moderating its 
aggressive posture in East Asia. 
This move allowed Kissinger and Chou to segue into a discussion on the issue of 
American involvement in the Vietnam War, and then following a brief interlude for dinner, to 
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engage in talks over the presence of US troops in Korea- both of which were of direct concern to 
Peking’s security interests. But, outside of passing references to the current presence of US 
troops in East Asia, Taiwan was not discussed at all for the duration of the meeting. While true 
that Kissinger was in no position to begin formal negotiations concerning the US-ROC alliance, 
he had nevertheless reiterated to Chou the terms that the United States was willing to operate on.  
Both Washington and Peking acknowledged that Taiwan was the primary diplomatic difference 
between the two, and the fact that both sides wished to finesse it did not indicate that it was 
unimportant. Paradoxically, by attempting to ‘put the issue aside,’ they were actually 
demonstrating how sensitive it was, and by extension, how crucial it remained to be ambiguous 
on the subject. 
The following day, the Kissinger and Chou groups met in the Great Hall of the People to 
continue their discussions. The Premier wasted no time in placing Taiwan back on the agenda. 
Regarding the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and PRC, 
Chou made several points to Kissinger. Peking desired that the Nixon Administration recognize 
Peking as the sole legitimate government of ‘China,’ accede to the fact that Taiwan was part of 
that entity, forswear any support of an independent Taiwan, and confirm that the island’s 
political status was no longer undetermined.204 These four points were the substance by which all 
countries that sought relations with Peking had to abide by, often referred to simply as the ‘One 
China Policy’.205 In the case of the United States, however, there was a unique implication 
behind accepting these demands. Essentially, the points which Chou was advancing would annul 
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the US-ROC MDA, as Washington could not possibly retain a legally-binding alliance with a 
country which it did not recognize to exist. Though Chou conveyed that these terms would not 
be a precondition for Nixon’s visit to Peking, these were the goals which he sought to fulfill in 
his future discussions with the President.  
Additionally, the Premier sought to outflank Kissinger on his linkage of US forces in 
Vietnam and Taiwan. As Chou conceded, the two issues were indeed linked, but according to 
Peking, the United States would need the PRC’s help in negotiating a settlement in Indochina, 
and that could only come from full diplomatic relations with Communist China.206 Therefore, 
Nixon would have to accept the One China Policy and renounce the US-ROC alliance if it 
wanted out of Vietnam. “Taiwan is not an isolated issue,” Chou stated, and asked “if your 
President were to come to the PRC without a clear cut attitude on this issue, then what 
impression would this give to the world?”207 
Kissinger was now back on the defensive. Seemingly pressured by Chou to make a 
commitment he did not believe he could keep, the National Security Adviser repeated that both 
the United States and PRC could satisfy their mutual interests by making a progressive 
withdrawal of US forces from the island. 208 Chou grew demonstrably frustrated by the repetition 
of this line. The Premier pressed Kissinger harder, saying that he was well aware of this, but that 
troop reductions would yield little in the way of settling the political issue of Taiwan’s 
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recognition by the United States.209 To this, the National Security Advisor replied that the United 
States was not plotting to indefinitely separate the two sides on the basis of a “one China, one 
Taiwan” solution, nor did they intend support the idea of there being ‘two Chinas’ based in 
Peking and Taipei.210 What Kissinger sought to convey to Chou in this statement was not an 
American abandonment of Taiwan’s security interests, but to indicate that Washington would not 
stand in the way of a peaceful resolution to the crisis in the Strait. According to his formulation, 
the Nixon Administration would “accept any political evolution agreed to by the parties,” 
provided that such an understanding could be arrived at peacefully.211 In short, if a political 
solution was possible, then the United States’ military commitments would not prevent it. His 
statement also affirmed that the United States would not support the KMT’s claim to be the de 
jure rulers of China, which both sides acknowledged was all but a delusion at this point. In the 
context of prior assurances made to Peking, neither point was anything beyond what the United 
States had already made clear in prior meetings- that the United States would oppose the use of 
force by both sides and that it wouldn’t stand in the way of an arrangement between them. 
However, in relation to the understanding of US-ROC ties prior to the Nixon Administration, 
such positions were precedent-breaking.  
Kissinger’s last formal meeting with Chou concluded late on the night of July 10th. For 
all intents and purposes, the two diplomats had succeeded in fixing their countries’ respective 
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foreign policy stances in advance of the proposed Peking visit by President Nixon.212 Chou’s 
more conciliatory approach to Taiwan notwithstanding, the meetings had served to reinforce the 
notion of the island’s centrality in US-PRC relations. Before retiring for the night, the Premier 
instructed Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission Yeh Chien-ying and diplomat 
Huang Hua to begin drafting the meeting’s joint communique with Kissinger.213 The two sides 
ran into trouble when it came to determining if the President’s visit would fully normalize 
diplomatic relations with the PRC.214 According to Huang’s formulation, the President’s visit 
would visit Peking for the purpose of formally derecognizing Taiwan and beginning the process 
of recognizing Communist China.215 The National Security Advisor flatly rejected this, as it went 
well beyond both what PRC diplomats said would be discussed at the meeting, and it directly 
conflicted with Nixon’s instruction to Kissinger that his meeting should not arrange a sell out of 
Taiwan.216 The two sides eventually settled on a straightforward communique which affirmed 
that the President accepted Chou’s invitation and tacked on a hope for future normalization 
between Peking and Washington.217 It would not be the last contentious joint message which 
Kissinger drafted. 
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Kissinger engaged in one last informal conversation with Chou before departing from 
Peking. Determined to plant Taiwan in the back of the National Security Advisor’s mind, the 
Premier indicated that he believed Nixon’s upcoming visit would speed up the process of the 
ROC’s eventual derecognition. Chou remarked that he hoped “by the time we have established 
diplomatic relations, the treaty between the US and Chiang Kai-shek should not have any 
effect.”218 Kissinger gave him the tried and tested reply that the United States would work to 
ensure that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.219 Following a brief exchange of other 
geopolitical topics, the two men decided that the exact date of President Nixon’s trip should be 
fixed for some point in late 1971 or early 1972. Anticipating both the optimism and the uproar 
from Kissinger’s visit, Chou parted ways with the National Security Advisor noting that news of 
their secret talks “will shake the world.”220 What the National Security Advisor had learned from 
his talks with Chou was how far the PRC demands related to Taiwan went. Though the Premier 
was receptive to Kissinger’s idea that Washington and Peking could put their issues aside 
momentarily, it was clear that the ultimate goal of the Communists was to wholly sever US-ROC 
relations- both in the diplomatic and military sense of the word. 
On July 14th, Kissinger prepared a memorandum for Nixon on his talks with the Premier. 
As he reported, the meeting helped to secure Nixon’s future visit to Peking while also exploring 
the topics to be discussed at the meeting.221 Regarding Taiwan, Kissinger conveyed that in 
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addition to the political derecognition of Chiang’s government, Chou was also demanding a total 
withdrawal of all US forces on the island and an annulment of the 1954 MDA.222 The latter term 
was out of the question, but the National Security Adviser noted that the former could be placed 
on the negotiating table. The two-thirds of the forces on Taiwan related to Indochina could be 
withdrawn as Vietnamization proceeded, but withdrawal of the latter “would depend on the 
general state of our relations with the PRC.”223 After the meeting, Chou also carried the 
American position on Taiwan to his boss. Upon being informed that the United States was 
willing to continue its withdrawals from the island, Mao appeared pleased with the results. 
Surprisingly enough, the Chairman even informed his Premier that settling the war in Indochina 
was more important than forcing the Americans to concede on Taiwan. “We are not in a hurry on 
the Taiwan issue because there is no fighting there,” Mao observed, “but there is a war in 
Vietnam and people are being killed there.”224 Evidently, the Chairman was more concerned 
about the conflict taking place on China’s southern flank than even US support for Peking’s 
nemesis.  
Damage Control 
 Chou was right to say that news of Kissinger’s trip would shake perceptions about the 
global balance of power. On July 15th, Nixon appeared before a press conference “to announce a 
major development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world.”225 In his pronouncement, 
he informed his audience that following Kissinger and Chou’s secret meeting, he had accepted 
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the PRC’s invitation to a summit. The President asserted that in light of this development, there 
was bound to be “inevitable speculation” by both American allies and adversaries alike.226 To 
allay this concern, he gave an oblique reassurance to Taiwan that “our action in seeking a new 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends.”227 
The fallout would come swiftly. 
 The ROC’s fear of a sellout by the Americans was palpable following the July 15th 
announcement. As Kissinger reported, KMT criticism of the United States’ China initiative 
“continues at a high pitch,” with officials “alleging a US abandonment of principle and betrayal 
of an ally.”228 ROC Premier Yen’s execration of the Nixon Administration was especially 
acerbic. According to him, the President’s China initiative “could lead to a tragedy far more 
serious than that involved in the fall of the Chinese mainland” to the CCP back in 1949.229 
Additionally, by attempting to moderate PRC behavior through diplomacy, he argued that 
Washington was “harboring unrealistic illusions” about Peking’s desire for peace in East Asia.230 
Taiwan’s new ambassador to the United States, James Shen, carried many of these criticisms 
directly to Assistant Secretary Green in a formal diplomatic protest.231 He stated that the 
Kissinger trip and the arrangement of a summit in Peking could “hardly be described as a 
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friendly act,” adding that the entire free world would suffer as a result.232 Strangely enough, 
Chiang Kai-shek did not seem outwardly concerned by the news of July 15th. According to one 
source close to Chiang, Taiwan’s leader was “very calm” after being passed the news of Nixon’s 
announcement.233 Perhaps this was due to the fact that Chiang had weathered other storms 
before, or because he felt assured by Nixon’s personal guarantees about the US defense 
commitment to his regime- either way, the Generalissimo’s qualms were more restrained than 
those of his subordinates.  
 Domestically, the China Lobby in the United States was in an uproar. William F. Buckley 
personally phoned Kissinger to inform him that in light of possible alterations to the “defense 
situation” of Taiwan, members of his group “have resolved to suspend [their] support of the 
Administration.”234 Buckley was not alone in this regard. As the New York Times reported, “Mr. 
Nixon’s former friends in the conservative wing of the Republican party were puzzled and 
dismayed” by the President's pursuit of improved relations with the PRC.235 These defections 
concerned Nixon greatly, as his rise to prominence as a red-baiter during the McCarthy era had 
been fueled, in part, by support from the China Lobby. In a private conversation with Secretary 
of State Rogers on the matter, the President confided that he had to find a way to handle “the 
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hardliners in the House and Senate...people, frankly, who are still part of the China Lobby, which 
is still a considerable group.”236 Nixon’s apprehensions about losing the support of the Lobby 
dissipated in the proceeding months, as the congressional and public support for his summit with 
Mao vastly outweighed the subduing factor posed by the hardline supporters of Nationalist 
China.237 Moreover, Nixon’s own pedigree as a staunch conservative helped insulate him from 
accusations that he had gone soft on communism.238 Members of the ‘old guard’ like Buckley 
and Walter Judd simply could not resist the rising tide of support for detente with Peking. As one 
observer noted in hindsight, the President’s July 15th announcement represented the “doomsday” 
of the China Lobby.239 
 Nixon was now in the unenviable position of having to calm the storm that his press 
conference helped to create. On July 17th, Nixon instructed Ambassador McConaughy to deliver 
a message to Chiang to guarantee him that there would be no drastic changes to the US-ROC 
relationship in the foreseeable future. “I wish to assure you that the United States will maintain 
its ties of friendship with your country,” his message stated, and added that Washington “will 
continue to honor its defense treaty commitment to the Republic of China.”240 What this 
indicated was that though Nixon was interested in deepening ties between the US and PRC, he 
believed that there could be some formula by which Washington could keep its legal treaty 
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commitments to Taipei and have diplomatic ties with Peking. During this time, Kissinger also 
acted to conciliate the temper of ROC officials. In a meeting with Ambassador Shen, the 
National Security Adviser offered a similar assurance that the United States “would not betray 
old friends, or turn anyone over to communism to ease our problems.”241 During this 
conversation, Kissinger also provided Shen with the plan by which the United States sought to 
use its MDA with Taiwan to leverage peace between Taipei and Peking. As he stated, the United 
States would “not oppose any peaceful solution which the ROC and the PRC worked out” and 
that the alliance between the US and ROC would help in compelling both sides towards this 
end.242 The time frame immediately following Nixon’s July 15 announcement was a time of 
extreme contention in US-ROC relations. While the United States had damaged its credibility 
with Chiang’s government in holding meetings with Chou, THe Administration sought to use 
personal assurances about the strength of the US-ROC defense pact to shore up trust with 
Taiwan. Nixon himself would acknowledge this in his memoirs. “Our friends in Taiwan were 
terribly distressed,” he recalled, “however, they were reassured that we did not withdraw our 
recognition of their government and did not renounce our mutual defense commitment.”243 
Moreover, the Nixon Administration backed these assertions with concrete efforts to support 
Taiwan. 
Despite the diplomatic shocks between the United States and the ROC that occurred over 
the course of 1971, the former continued to reinforce the latter through substantial aid programs. 
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Economically speaking, the United States sought to provide financing for the country’s “import 
substituting industrialization” to ensure the island country’s continued self-sufficiency.244 In 
1971 alone, the United States had provided over $52 million in subsidies to support the ROC’s 
expanding GDP, with most of the funds that year going towards the support of Taiwan’s nuclear 
power program.245 In light of Taiwan’s improving economy,  the United States began a process 
of weaning the country off MAP programs, transitioning to the use of FMS as a means to bolster 
the country’s defense capabilities.246 By the end of 1971, aid through MAP programs had 
dropped to $18,664,000, but military sales to Taiwan through the FMS program had gone up to 
$56,672,000- a substantial increase from 1970.247 Arms sales were not the only means through 
which the United States continued to bolster ROC military capabilities. In connection with the 
drawdown of forces in Indochina, the US military was now flush with arms it did not plan to use 
in connection with the Vietnam War. These ‘excess defense articles’ were often transferred to 
the arsenals of American allies, and Taiwan benefited greatly from this. According to one 
insider, the ROC continued to receive “a steady stream of cut rate weapons out of the mammoth 
Vietnam stockpile,” adding that some of these transfers were often “unauthorized, uncontrolled, 
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and often unknown to the Congress.”248 In fiscal year 1971 alone, the United States was 
estimated to have delivered $45,454,000 worth of surplus arms through this program.249 Hence, 
if Taiwan was feeling that its public friendship with the United States was waning following 
Nixon’s July 15th announcement, both economic and military data seemed to belie this 
sentiment.  
Showdown at the UN  
 Aside from the Nixon Administration’s announcement of a trip to Peking, the year 1971 
dealt Taiwan another major challenge to its political legitimacy, namely, over its membership in 
the United Nations (UN). The ROC had been one of the early members of the organization, and 
by virtue of its post-World War II status as a member of the ‘Big Four,’ it occupied a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council. Taiwan’s representation on this committee was an oddity in the 
1970s, as its seat therein gave an island of some 14 million people the same political and military 
influence afforded to superpowers like the United States and Soviet Union. The announcement of 
the Kissinger-Chou talks had reignited debate on Taiwan’s status within the UN, not just as a 
member of the Security Council, but as a member of the UN writ large. As Kissinger remarked, 
“our opening to Peking effectively determined the outcome of the UN debate, although we did 
not realize this immediately.”250 
 Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, both the PRC and ROC jockeyed with 
one another in the UN over their claim to be the sole representative of the entity called ‘China’ in 
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the General Assembly.251 While Taipei sought to maintain its position as a member, Peking 
fought hard on the diplomatic scene to be admitted and for Taiwan to be expelled. This had been 
the case for well over two decades now. Thus, the ROC’s tedious membership in the 
organization was not a new consideration for the Nixon Administration, nor was it new to US 
politics during the Cold War. Starting in 1950, the United States was able to construct a reliable 
bloc of voters in the UN to block further deliberations about Taiwan’s membership in the 
body.252 Through sly political maneuvering, this group had used its simple majority in the 
General Assembly to make a vote on Taiwan’s membership in the organization an ‘Important 
Question,’ meaning that any motion to eject the ROC would require a two-thirds majority to 
actually pass. Year after year, the PRC’s allies managed to place the issue on the General 
Assembly’s voting agenda, and the ROC’s allies handily voted down any further attempts to seat 
Peking in the organization.253 
 A number of new considerations changed the United States’ rigid approach to opposing 
PRC admission while maintaining that the ROC represented the sole ‘China’ in the UN. First, 
from the start of his outreach to the PRC, Nixon had made it clear of the need to include Peking 
in ‘the family of nations’ in order to moderate the country’s aggressive behavior.254 To continue 
to oppose Communist China’s admission into the body was wholly against the rationale behind 
‘opening’ the PRC. The second challenge to the United States’ unqualified support of the ROC 
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in the UN was that several of Washington’s close allies, including Britain, France, Italy, and 
Canada, had fully recognized the PRC and supported Peking’s seating in the organization. The 
third and most pressing consideration was the effect which decolonization was having on the 
composition of the General Assembly. Through its Maoist interpretation of Marxism, the PRC 
had long presented itself as the leader of the Third World, and many of the new post-colonial 
states in Africa and Southeast Asia assented to this.255 The admission of new left-leaning, PRC-
friendly regimes like those of Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, and Senegal acted to shift support in 
the General Assembly in favor of Peking’s admission.256 The 1970 vote to expel Taiwan and seat 
the PRC reflected this. When the voting had concluded, the majority had voted in favor of 
ejecting the Nationalist Chinese and seating the Communist Chinese in the organization. The 
ROC’s allies were able to save the country’s seat only by scrounging together 66 votes to make 
the representation issue an Important Question, defeating the PRC allies by a margin of 14 
votes.257 It was the closest vote yet on the issue. 
 Though it would have been expedient for Nixon to support the PRC and vote to expel the 
ROC, American policymakers believed that Taiwan’s membership in the UN was vital to 
preserving the country’s legitimacy on the world stage, and by extension, its security against a 
PRC attack. Going back to the Kennedy Administration, the United States had maintained in no 
uncertain terms that “the best long term political and military defense of Taiwan will require that 
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the [ROC] continue to be represented in the UN.”258 Even with the new outreach to Peking, this 
stance had changed little by the 1970s. According to a CIA report, policymakers in the Nixon 
Administration “speculated that the loss of UN membership...could break the will of the 
Nationalists to resist absorption by the Communists, precipitate domestic instability, or inspire 
aggressive communist actions against the island.”259 The propaganda victory afforded by an 
expulsion would indeed bolster the PRC’s claim that Taiwan was not a legitimate state, and 
therefore, would not be protected by the mores of international law. As Nixon feared, the island 
nation would be regarded as an international “pariah” if expelled from the organization.260 For 
him, if the US-ROC MDA and its concomitant security relationship were seen as a stop-break on 
PRC actions against Taiwan, then the country’s membership in the UN provided a second one.  
The Nixon Administration was facing an uphill struggle, and as such, its policymakers 
doubted that the United States could afford to stymie Peking’s admission and retain Taipei's seat 
on the Security Council. At the same time, the failure of the United States to support the ROC at 
this time would be a flagrant abandonment of its ally, and call into question the American 
willingness to uphold its commitments. To solve this dilemma, the NSC had directed in NSSM 
107 that an interdepartmental study be conducted on the question of Chinese Representation 
(Chirep) in the UN. One of the options which the study recommended, and the one which the 
Administration would widely accept, was that the United States advocate a “dual representation” 
approach wherein the American delegation would maintain its commitment to ROC 
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representation but not oppose PRC membership in the body.261 This maneuver was bound to 
meet stiff opposition from both Peking and Taipei. Despite lip service paid to PRC diplomats 
that the United States would not support a ‘two China’ solution to the Taiwan Strait crisis, the 
American position on the Chirep issue demonstrated that these promises were nothing more than 
sweet diplomatic nothings. The ROC, likewise, had made it clear that it would not accept dual 
representation, as this would undercut Chiang’s claims to be the de jure leader of ‘China’. The 
Generalissimo had indicated that this formula was anathema to him, stating that “there is no 
room for patriots and traitors to live together.”262  
The deadline for such a decision was approaching fast. During the UN’s 26th Session, the 
PRC’s sole ally, the People’s Republic of Albania, announced its intention to introduce a 
resolution which would eject the ROC and seat the PRC at both the General Assembly and on 
the Security Council.263 As Secretary of State Rogers informed Nixon, the debate on this so-
called ‘Albanian Resolution’ was slated to begin on October 18, 1971.264 At a press conference 
on September 16th that year, Nixon publicly laid out the United States’ position on the matter. 
While seating Peking in the General Assembly and the Security Council “reflects the realities of 
the situation,” he conceded, the American delegation would “vote against the expulsion of the 
Republic of China” from the organization.265 The Administration planned to mount a rearguard 
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action at the UN, wherein they would attempt to save Taiwan’s seat by voting to make the 
Albanian Resolution an Important Question while supporting a motion admitting the PRC and 
seating them on the Security Council.266 The dual representation formula was the only way this 
could happen. On October 1, the State Department issued a high priority telegram to all its 
foreign posts in which it directed American diplomats to gauge where its allies stood on 
Taiwan’s representation. The telegram noted forebodingly that “if the ROC should be deprived 
of representation, this would be a dangerous precedent.”267 
At this point in time, the Nixon Administration moved to consult Taiwan on its plans for 
how to approach the UN issue. In a meeting with ROC Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai, Nixon 
assured the diplomat that the American delegation was “prepared to fight” on Taiwan’s behalf, 
and that the country’s presence in the UN “is a fact of life for us and we will do nothing to give it 
up.”268 Additionally, he noted that the decision of the General Assembly, whether in Taiwan’s 
favor or against it, would not dilute the existing MDA.269 Kissinger discussed analogous points 
with Ambassador Shen later on October 10th. The National Security Advisor informed him that 
the task before them in the UN would be “painful,” but nevertheless, the United States “would 
certainly do nothing to sacrifice our central interests,” in reference to the alliance with Taiwan.270 
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Shen reacted positively to the points which Kissinger had raised, and added that for Taiwan in 
the long term, “being in or out of the UN was not important, what our enemies wanted was for us 
to give up our defense relationship.”271 On top of the UN issue, Kissinger also used this meeting 
with Shen to notify the Ambassador that he would be making one final visit to Peking ahead of 
Nixon’s own trip. Evidently, the National Security Advisor did not want to take the same flak he 
had back in July after his secret meeting with Chou. Meetings such as these spoke to the greater 
degree of transparency in US-ROC relations in the latter half of 1971, spurred in large part by the 
looming debate on Taiwan at the UN.272 As Nixon acknowledged, Taipei’s seat at the General 
Assembly and on the Security Council was of great psychological importance to them, and 
taking a firm stand on their behalf was a means of mending the rifts in the alliance that had 
formed over the last several months. At stake was not just Taiwan’s membership on an 
international body, but to a large degree, its status as a legitimate state entity.  
The American Ambassador to the UN, George Bush, was to be the Nixon 
Administration’s point man in defending Taiwan in the General Assembly. Per Washington’s 
plan, the US delegation would submit a resolution for dual representation of both the ROC and 
PRC in the organization while gathering a coalition to oppose the Albanian Resolution.273 Should 
those two motions fail, the American side would revert back to its ‘Important Question’ strategy. 
As the President instructed Bush on the matter, the Ambassador was to “go all out—especially 
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on procedural matters.”274 Despite the efforts of Bush and the Delegation to scrounge together a 
coalition in favor of Taiwan, the situation at the UN’s 26th Session looked grim. Deputy 
Secretary for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig reported that the United States’ crucial 
resolutions did not have the votes to win in the General Assembly, and the Important Question 
and Dual Representation strategies were likely to be beaten by the Albanian Resolution.275  
The UN vote proceeded along the lines which Haig had predicted. On October 25th, the 
General Assembly voted on the Albanian Resolution, which won handily with 76 in favor and 35 
opposing.276 Thereafter, the US resolution to make this motion an Important Question was 
defeated by a vote of 55 in favor and 59 against.277 Much to the chagrin of the American 
delegation, the General Assembly also struck down the dual representation strategy.278 As Bush 
concluded, last minute lobbying by the Arab countries, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Pakistan, Somalia, 
and even US allies Britain and France acted to tip the scales in favor of Peking’s admission.279 
Rather than being officially ejected from the organization, the ROC made one last defiant move. 
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai took the podium at the General Assembly, declaring 
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his country had decided to “withdraw from the organization which it helped to establish.”280 
Thus, after 22 years of membership, the ROC left the United Nations. Though defeated, the 
Nixon Administration did not despair at their efforts. As Secretary Rogers later surmised, “we 
lost, but our position was right.”281 Chiang, obstinate to the end, also made it a point for the ROC 
to go down swinging. In a press release statement, the Generalissimo decried the conduct of the 
General Assembly, and proclaimed that his country’s withdrawal from the UN “presaged the 
demise of the United Nations itself.”282 Isolated seemingly on all fronts, his regime now 
depended almost exclusively on the United States for international support.  
The majority of 1971 was an exceptionally difficult time for US-ROC relations, and to 
borrow Kissinger’s frequent description of the situation, it was a “painful” one.283 While it was 
one thing to formulate rosy portraits about a future balance of power engendered by a US-PRC 
relationship, it was another thing to deal with the harm that a potential opening was bound to 
inflict on American allies. By every measure, Taiwan bore the brunt of it. During this time, the 
Nixon Administration found itself shuttling back and forth between reaching out to Peking and 
reassuring Taipei. Though Washington generated no shortage of formulas about how to 
minimize the damage done to the US-ROC alliance and ‘open’ the PRC, none of these strategies 
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provided a solution which satisfied both. At least for now, Nixon and Kissinger’s sought after 
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Chapter 3: Sleight of Hand 
Though Nixon’s 1972 trip to China should have been a development which his 
Administration viewed with great optimism, it was obvious that the US-ROC defense 
relationship hung in the balance. As normalization between Washington and Peking appeared to 
draw closer, the major question which American policymakers wrestled with was how to 
recalibrate their alliance with Taiwan without jeopardizing their security. No doubt, the President 
would face great pressure in Peking from politicians like Chou to renege on this commitment. 
From 1972 onward, the United States aimed to achieve a degree of ambiguity on the subject- 
committing itself to a peaceful solution while its partnership with the ROC assumed a decidedly 
deterrent nature. Such a balance would allow the Administration to play the role of distant 
moderator in the possible detente between Taipei and Peking.   
Amid the flare-up of Taiwan’s departure from the UN, Kissinger made one final trip to 
Peking in October before Nixon’s summit there. Though the PRC had responded to the 
American position on Taiwan at the UN with its usual acerbic rhetoric, the attacks from its state-
run media appeared to have little effect on substantive relations with Washington.285 Indeed, 
Premier Chou’s relatively friendly greeting to Kissinger on the first day of the meeting seemed to 
belie any serious falling-out between the two countries.286 On the second day of their talks, they 
turned to their respective countries’ most sensitive issues, chiefly, that of Taiwan. Kissinger 
reiterated the American position that the United States planned to withdraw two-thirds of its 
forces from the island once the war in Vietnam terminated, but that further reductions were 
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conditional on Peking’s efforts to improve relations with Washington.287 For the first time, he 
then presented to Chou the idea of Peking renouncing the use of force to resolve the Straits 
crisis.288 Though Kissinger expressed that it was vital for a solution to be achieved through 
peaceful means, he assured Chou that the actual terms of such an agreement was “for the 
[Nationalist and Communist] Chinese themselves to settle.”289  
Chou seemed pleased with this arrangement, but required clarification. He then asked 
what would happen to the US-ROC MDA if Taiwan were peacefully unified with the 
Mainland.290 As Kissinger stated, the purpose of the treaty was primarily to defend the island 
from a military takeover by the PRC, and if Peking settled the Straits crisis peacefully while 
improving its relationship with Washington, then the MDA could be abrogated.291 He also added 
that under no circumstances would the United States allow Japan to begin stationing troops on 
Taiwan, which had been a frequent sticking point in talks with PRC diplomats.292 After the two 
briefly discussed Taiwan’s status in the UN, their conversation then turned to the issue of the 
Vietnam War, which Chou identified as “an even more urgent issue” to be settled between the 
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two sides.293 This was in large part due to the fact that, militarily speaking, the PRC was deeply 
involved  in aiding the communist war effort in Indochina. Having an existing conflict so close 
to its southern flank was, apparently, more concerning than simply the presence  of American 
troops on one of the islands which Peking claimed. It was thus an issue that both sides could 
agree to neutralize, as neither wanted to prolong the conflict any further. Focusing on this issue 
of mutual concern provided for more productive conversation than about Taiwan. The Premier 
had clearly taken to heart Mao’s earlier comment that the wars in Indochina were more 
proximally pressing than settling the Taiwan Strait dispute.294  
Despite the relative ease with which the two diplomats moved through their talks over the 
past several days, they hit their greatest point of contention when it came to drafting a joint 
communique ahead of Nixon’s visit. Per diplomatic protocol, this would be the formative 
document which set the terms for the President’s summit in February.295 In the early drafting 
process of the American position, the National Security Advisor and his staff intentionally 
limited references to Taiwan, hoping to maintain a degree of constructive ambiguity.296 Upon 
receiving the US draft statement for review. However, Chou and his team were repulsed. 
Specifically, they took issue with the draft’s affirmation that the Taiwan Strait crisis should be 
resolved through peaceful means, which the Premier resisted on the grounds that it 
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acknowledged the ‘Chiang clique’ on Taiwan as a sovereign entity.297 This rejection was 
particularly telling in light of a prior statement which Chou made to Kissinger, in which the 
former stated that Peking reserved the right to settle the Strait crisis by “other means” if a 
peaceful resolution were not reached within roughly six years.298 After meeting with Mao to 
discuss the American draft, Chou then arranged a follow-up with Kissinger on October 24, 
launching into a fairly confrontational diatribe on the issue of Taiwan.299 In his polemic, he 
reasserted the demand that the United States must commit to renouncing its alliance with the 
ROC, and that the communique would be the vehicle to announce this change.300 Kissinger had 
proven adept in his ability to rhetorically maneuver around the Premier’s insistences, but he now 
provided Chou with an “unusually hard” reply.301 The National Security Advisor informed the 
Premier that Peking “would not respect us if we started our new relationship by betraying our old 
friends,” giving him one final assurance that “we would not renounce our Taiwan ties.”302 
Though Chou had cut through Kissinger’s ambiguity, he did not get the reply he wanted.  
As a consequence, the two parties began a lengthy exchange of drafts and counter drafts 
of the communique. By evening on October 24th, Chou’s staff had submitted an innovative 
formula for the communique. Rather than seeking to establish a Sino-US consensus on all issues 
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that Nixon was due to discuss in Peking, the PRC delegation instead proposed that the statement 
would cover policy positions on which the two sides disagreed while also stating their 
convergent views.303 It was a novel approach to how diplomatic communiques were normally 
crafted. Evidently, the PRC had come to see the value of the American approach to negotiations, 
namely, in demonstrating their ability to acknowledge existing differences but also show a 
willingness to cooperate in the interests of grand strategy.304 As it would develop, this approach 
underscored the fact that in the long term, the nascent US-PRC partnership would be one of 
convenience, not of principle.  
Under this rubric, Kissinger submitted his own addition to the communique, which would 
deal specifically with the Taiwan issue. For him, the dilemma would be “how to recognize [the 
policy of] One China” without abandoning American support for its ROC ally.305 To do this, the 
National Security Advisor drew up a formula by which the United States would simply 
acknowledge the PRC’s claim over Taiwan, without formally declaring Washington’s support or 
opposition to this assertion. Kissinger’s new section opened by stating that the US side 
“acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a province of China.”306 On this point, neither the most staunch 
member of the CCP or the KMT could disagree. Kissinger’s addition went on to affirm the 
American interest in resolving the Straits crisis through peaceful means, the Administration’s 
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desire to remove its forces “as tensions diminish,” and a promise that the United States would 
not use its military presence to stop such a peaceful settlement.307 Along the lines of constructive 
ambiguity, the wording of this statement was very elastic. Without affirming or denying Peking’s 
claim to Taiwan, the United States resolved to state a fact that both ‘Chinas’ had acknowledged 
for decades now- that there was one ‘China’ and that Taiwan was a part of it. In this way, the 
United States mollified the PRC while deliberately keeping the issue of the US-ROC MDA 
totally off of the negotiating table.  
Kissinger pitched this addition to Chou early in the morning on October 26th.Though the 
Premier did not reject the wording out of pocket, he criticized the wording of the Taiwan section 
for its vagueness.308 Kissinger informed him that this was a fundamental difference between 
what the United States could propose versus what the PRC was seeking. To uphold its credibility 
with the ROC (and indeed the world), the American side had to maintain a degree of elasticity on 
the issue. “The [Premier] seeks clarity,” Kissinger observed to Chou, “and I am trying to achieve 
ambiguity.”309 For the moment, the PRC side could not be swayed. As Chou generalized, his 
people would be “dissatisfied with something that is ambiguous.”310 In any case, the two sides 
recognized that they were unlikely to finish drafting the communique before Nixon was able to 
speak with Mao in February the following year. 311 Though Kissinger and Chou had managed to 
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agree on a general formula for the joint communique, its specifics were still undecided when the 
National Security Advisor left Peking later that day.312 
Preparations and Assurances 
The October meeting failed to complete the drafting process for a joint statement, but it 
did lay the foundation for the so-called ‘Shanghai Communique’ which Nixon and Mao would 
assent to in February 1972. Much of what had been drafted between Kissinger and Chou would 
make its way into the final document, but the entire section on Taiwan remained blank at the end 
of the trip. As Kissinger observed, if the United States could finesse this issue, the 
Administration would have “have a communique that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to 
our friends and positive for the further development of US-[PRC] relations.”313 In his report to 
Nixon, the National Security advisor reiterated the points he had discussed with Chou regarding 
Taiwan- that the United States would continue to reduce its presence on the island, accept a 
peaceful resolution of the PRC-ROC dispute, and would not compel either side towards a ‘two-
China’ or a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ solution.314 What undergirded these assumptions, however, 
was the idea that Peking was willing to accept a peaceful resolution in the first place. In the 
absence of a negotiated settlement to the Straits crisis, Kissinger stated to Nixon that any 
softening of the US-ROC security arrangement would remain “unlikely.”315 
 While Kissinger had been away in Peking, the Chinese Communists had scored a great 
geopolitical victory through the ROC’s UN ouster. According to American estimates, “a major 
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challenge to the PRC’s claim to Taiwan ha[d] been defeated” following the passage of the 
Albanian Resolution.316 Despite the psychological victory which Peking had been afforded, it 
meant next to nothing in terms of its effect on the US-ROC alliance or security ties. Immediately 
following the news of Taiwan’s withdrawal from the UN, Ambassador McConaughy had met 
with Chiang to affirm that “nothing has happened in the United Nations which will in any way 
affect the defense commitment... of the United States to the Republic of China.”317 Fresh from 
his meeting in Peking, Kissinger carried this same commitment to ROC Foreign Minister Chou 
Shu-kai, to which the latter replied that ties with the US would be of “preeminent importance” 
going forward.318 Contrary to the alarmist reports that UN expulsion could incite wide domestic 
instability on the island, Chou additionally conveyed to the National Security Advisor that 
prospects for Taiwan’s political and economic prosperity appeared positive for the foreseeable 
future.319 Later studies of Taiwan’s development would confirm this perspective, backing up the 
idea that the island’s developmental success owed little to its membership in the UN.320 Its status 
on the world stage, meanwhile, continued to be secured by virtue of its alliance with 
Washington.321 Reports of the ROC’s ‘death’ in the aftermath the UN decision thus appeared to 
have been greatly exaggerated.  
 
316 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Trends in Communist Propaganda,” November 3, 1971, CIA FOIA Electronic 
Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r000300040045-2, 3. 
317 Taiwan Review Staff, “We Have Only Begun to Fight,” November 1, 1971, Taiwan Review reprinted in Taiwan Today, 
https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=4&post=6104.  
318 “Memorandum of Conversation, Subject- Mr. Kissinger’s Visit to Peking, the UN Vote on Chirep, and U.S.–ROC Relations,” 
October 29, 1971, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d169.  
319 Ibid. 
320 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Weekly Summary, Special Report: Nationalist China Revisited,” June 28, 1974, CIA FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r001500060012-3, 4 
321 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Nationalist China Revisited,” 5.  
89 
 
 Ahead of Nixon’s trip to Peking, the Administration emphasized through both public and 
private assurances to the ROC that the summit in February would not dissolve the alliance 
between the two countries. First, Kissinger met with Ambassador James Shen to discuss his 
October meeting in Peking as well the President’s forthcoming visit in February. As the National 
Security Advisor informed the diplomat, the United States had every reason to want Taiwan to 
“stay alive, and to maintain their integrity and their identity,” with neither the meeting the 
previous month nor the UN vote having any impact on this.322 Regarding Peking’s perspective, 
he also added that, so long as the PRC believed it needed a partnership with Washington, 
policymakers like Chou were simply going to have to “overcome or ignore inconsistencies” like 
the US alliance with the ROC.323 On December 30th, Kissinger convened another meeting with 
Ambassador Shen, this time with Foreign Minister Chou accompanying him. In the most blunt 
terms possible, the National Security Adviser stated that though a PRC attack against Taiwan 
was unlikely in the near future, “if you are attacked, we will come to your defense.”324 Relating 
specifically to military aid, Kissinger assured the two diplomats that the United States would 
continue to furnish arms for Taiwan’s defense apparatus.325 Pursuant to the interests of both 
states, this equipment would largely be of a defensive rather than offensive nature.326 To round 
things off, Nixon gave his most public assurance to Taiwan during his annual report to Congress 
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on US foreign policy in early February 1972. In familiar terms, the President stated that “our new 
dialogue with the PRC would not be at the expense of friends,” and added that “we shall 
maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment [to Taiwan].”327 From 
this, Taipei had finally received the public re-affirmation of the US-ROC alliance it had been 
pressing the Administration to give for upwards of two years.  
Mr. Nixon Goes to Peking  
 On February 17, 1972, Nixon, Kissinger, and their entourage left Washington for their 
summit in Peking. Four days later, their plane touched down at Hung Chiao Airport in Shanghai, 
where they were greeted by Chou En-lai.328 In a highly symbolic gesture, the President shook the 
Premier’s hand upon disembarking the plane- a sharp reversal from the moment when Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles had refused Chou’s handshake at the Geneva talks in 1954.329 It was 
a testament to just how much relations between Peking and Washington had developed since the 
Eisenhower Administration. As Chou would remark to the President, “your handshake came over 
the vastest ocean in the world- twenty-five years of no communication.”330 
 These friendly gestures papered over the fact that Nixon came prepared to play hardball. 
Both he and Kissinger knew all too well the possibility that the American commitments to 
Taiwan were likely to confound the talks over the next week. Prior to leaving for the trip, Nixon 
expressed doubt that the PRC would accept a ‘peaceful resolution’ clause in the still-incomplete 
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Taiwan section of the joint communique. Kissinger was of the opinion that while the American 
side could place this proposition into their section, the idea that Peking would agree to such 
terms was “almost inconceivable.”331 With this in mind, Nixon affirmed to his National Security 
Advisor that the US delegation should operate under the assumption that the United States would 
not be “giving up on our treaty” either during the talks or afterwards.332  
 Nixon had not expected to meet with Mao during the Summit, such a possibility was a 
remote one at best. However, on the day of the President’s arrival, the aging leader of the PRC 
suddenly felt energized enough to take part in the meetings.333 Shortly after reaching Peking, 
Mao requested a meeting with the President at this Zhongnanhai residence.334 Once there, the 
Chairman greeted Nixon with a characteristically sardonic remark, noting that “our common old 
friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, doesn’t approve of this.”335 Having opened on a 
reference to the US-ROC relationship, it was therefore interesting that when Nixon broached the 
idea of discussing Taiwan, Mao bushed this suggestion off. Rather than beginning with a 
discussion of the “troublesome problems” between them, the Chairman instead wanted to talk 
more broadly about the international scene, especially issues relating to Japan, Pakistan, and the 
Koreas.336 The first day’s discussions with Mao were a surprisingly banal affair, and outside of 
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free associating about the geopolitical scene, the two sides talked little about the very real rifts 
between them.  
 The second day’s talks between Nixon and Chou were decidedly more substantive than 
the previous ones. As the ‘philosopher,’ Mao often spoke in elliptical generalities, which was 
why he needed his tactician, Chou, to get down to specifics with men like Nixon.337 
Consequently, in the discussions on February 22, the President and the Premier were committed 
to addressing the immediate issues posed by Taiwan. Nixon began by restating the main points 
which Kissinger had hammered out in the draft communique back in October. The President 
assured Chou that Taiwan was a part of the entity called ‘China,’ that the United States did not 
support the Taiwan Independence Movement, that Japan would not be allowed to station troops 
on the island, and that Washington wanted the Straits crisis settled peacefully.338 The United 
States desired normalization of relations with the PRC, Nixon added, but the outstanding 
American alliance with Taiwan was a major barrier to this. With this consideration, the United 
States, he indicated, was willing to draw down its forces on Taiwan in concert with the end of the 
war in Vietnam and “as progress is made on the peaceful resolution [of the Taiwan strait 
crisis].”339 In providing this assurance, Nixon was demonstrating two ideas. First, that he was 
committed to breaking Peking’s fears of military encirclement, deviating from the precedent 
established by Truman and Eisenhower’s efforts to contain China following the Korean War. 
Second, Nixon viewed the American troop presence on Taiwan to be a secondary factor in 
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ensuring the ties of security between Washington and Taipei. If the PRC were to formally agree 
to some sort of a status quo in East Asia, the need to ‘contain’ the Communist using American 
forces on the island would abate. 
Nixon then told Chou candidly that for domestic and international reasons, he could not 
afford to be “the American president [who] went to Peking and sold Taiwan down the river.”340 
With this in consideration, the President stated the need for a communique which satisfied the 
American imperative to maintain its credibility and gave Peking an affirmation that Washington 
was acting in good faith.341 Constructive ambiguity on the Taiwan issue would be the only way 
to accomplish this. In reply, Zhou accepted the points on Taiwan which Nixon had provided him. 
Though it was the Premier’s goal that the island would “come back to the motherland,” Peking 
was willing to wait for this settlement to occur over a period of time.342 While his statement 
should not be construed as a commitment to a peaceful resolution, the Premier’s statement was 
indicative of Peking’s growing pragmatism on the Straits crisis. It also reflected, according to 
Kissinger, the PRC’s idea “that continuing differences over Taiwan were secondary to our 
primary mutual concern over the international equilibrium.”343  
As these talks proceeded, Kissinger was at work with Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao 
Kuan-hua in completing the joint communique, which had remained unfinished since October 
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delicate part of the statement- the section on Taiwan.345 Kissinger went into the discussions 
operating from the artfully vague point that the island was a part of ‘China,’ which Ch’iao did 
not challenge.346 Most of the contentions the two sides raised regarded the connotations of 
certain words in Kissinger’s draft of the Taiwan section. Specifically, Ch’iao took issue with the 
defense-related statements that the United States “[was] prepared” to make troop withdrawals 
from the island, and that Washington would “progressively reduce” its presence there.347 Such 
terminology, the Deputy Foreign Minister would remark, was “too loose” and “might even imply 
no action at all.”348Admittedly, this hedging language was an attempt to give the Administration 
some leeway when it came to the actual time table of the troop reductions. Kissinger was able to 
get around this line of criticism with an equally vague assurance that it was the Administration’s  
“ultimate objective” for a complete pull-out once tensions in the area had dissipated.349 
After haggling over the semantics of the Taiwan section in the communique, the two 
sides reached a workable solution to the question of the American defense commitment to the 
ROC. Notably, the formulation which the two sides would agree upon was markedly similar to 
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that which Ch’iao had presented to Kissinger in their meeting on February 25.350 The final 
written communique stated:  
“[The US] reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it 
will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in 
the area diminishes.”351 
 
The main importance of this section in the communique was that it made no explicit mention of 
the US-ROC MDA- either in support of it or against it. This omission was deliberate, as both 
sides tacitly acknowledged that the other was unwilling to make further concessions in this area. 
As Kissinger highlighted, the Administration was likely to receive flak for not specifically 
stating its treaty commitments in the communique, and even conveyed to Ch’iao that 
Washington planned to publicly acknowledge that the defense commitment “remains in force” 
following the statement’s publication.352  On the question of the troop withdrawals mentioned in 
this section, the Nixon Administration evidently did not believe that reducing US forces on the 
island would impinge upon its ability to uphold its bargains to Taipei. This was especially the 
case as the two reasons for the troop presence in the first place- the Vietnam War and a possible 
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PRC invasion of Taiwan- were dissipating. Hence, the communique’s statement that withdrawals 
would continue “as tensions diminish”353 
 Both the American and Communist Chinese sides signed off on the joint statement on 
February 27, 1972, and in light of where it was signed, the proclamation came to be known as 
the ‘Shanghai Communique.’ As its section on Taiwan metonymically demonstrated, the 
document set forth a number of principles on which Peking and Washington disagreed, while 
also affirming their need to cooperate on issues of mutual geopolitical concern. Regarding the 
US defense commitment to the ROC, the statements put forth in the Communique were at once 
“artful, subtle, misleading, and somewhat confused.”354 In a way, however, this degree of 
obscurity was exactly what the Administration hoped to achieve. The President would recall in 
his memoirs that he and his team “felt that we should not and could not abandon the Taiwanese,” 
making a “strongly worded” Communique not conducive to American interests.355 Thus, what 
Kissinger had leveraged in his negotiations with Ch’iao had summarily “finessed the Taiwan 
problem through mutual and ambiguous compromise.”356 This was ‘constructive ambiguity’ in 
its most pronounced form, and helped to set up the “modus vivendi” the Administration had 
hoped to achieve since 1971.357 One major issue remained unresolved by the Communique, 
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however- Peking had neither renounced the use of force against Taiwan nor committed itself to a 
peaceful resolution of its dispute with the ROC.  
Fallout 
 Among the United States’ Pacific allies, Taiwan was naturally the most affected by 
Nixon’s China trip. Accordingly, Taipei had few positive reactions to both the Communique and 
the President’s visit. One analysis by the CIA succinctly summed up that politicians on Taiwan 
“remain deeply suspicious that the US commitment to them has been seriously weakened” after 
the February summit.358 While relatively muted in his response, Chiang Ching-kuo meanwhile 
asserted that Taipei was experiencing “uncertainty and anxiety” concerning the implications of 
‘opening’ Peking.359 Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry shared this perspective, and issued a lengthy 
denunciation of Washington’s initiative on February 28th. It reserved its major criticisms for the 
Shanghai Communique, whose positions were considered “null and void” by KMT authorities.360 
 To head off the tide of criticism, the Nixon Administration issued a number of public 
statements aimed at allaying Taipei’s fears of a sellout. At a press conference in Shanghai, 
Kissinger answered a number of questions about the Communique, including one regarding the 
statement’s effect on the US-ROC MDA. “We stated our basic position with respect to this issue 
in the President’s world report [on February 2],” the National Security Advisor replied, “we say 
that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that position.”361 Nixon provided 
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another similar assurance in a speech he delivered at Andrews Air Force Base upon returning to 
Washington. In his pronouncement, he stated that US forces on Taiwan would be “gradually 
reduced as tensions ease,” with total withdrawal being contingent on a “peaceful settlement” 
between the PRC and ROC.362 His Administration, he assured, had no plans to “negotiate the fate 
of other nations behind their backs,” and had acted “without giving up any United States 
commitment to any other country.”363  
 Beyond simply making public statements affirming the validity of the MDA, Kissinger 
conducted another meeting with Ambassador James Shen on March 1 to discuss the nature of the 
post-Communique alliance with the ROC. According to the National Security Advisor, it would 
have been “impossible” to affirm the MDA in the joint statement, but counseled that Taipei 
should feel secure in the current state of the defense relationship.364 Essentially, the omission of 
the US-ROC alliance in the Shanghai Communique did not imply its abrogation. Shen accepted 
this point, but drew attention to the American plan to reduce its forces on the island. Kissinger 
stated that at present, the withdrawals scheduled by the Administration included a reduction of 
about 3,000 troops and possibly two of the United States’ C-130 squadrons.365 Further pullouts 
before the resolution of the Vietnam War or the Taiwan Strait crisis remained unlikely. At the 
meeting’s conclusion, Kissinger declared that the US aim was “not to liquidate Taiwan, and not 
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to scuttle our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China,” but “to move in a new 
direction with Peking.”366  
 On March 8th, Kissinger forwarded a memo to Nixon from Secretary Rogers which laid 
out what state believed to be the best course of action on Taiwan going forward. The 
memorandum from the State Department affirmed that the United States should continue to press 
both sides of the Straits towards a peaceful resolution, seeking more contacts with Peking all the 
while “maintain[ing] our existing relationship [with Taipei] including the mutual defense 
treaty.”367 As Rogers predicted, the growing nature of ties between the United States and PRC 
could motivate the Communist Chinese to “become less dogmatic” about the need to gain control 
over Taiwan, either through peaceful or military means.368 Interestingly, the Secretary of State 
did not rule out the possibility of Taiwan developing into its own separate country outside the 
reach of Peking. Nixon shared this view, and envisioned Taiwan developing its own “orbit” 
outside the Mainland, or at the very least, reaching a peaceful accommodation with the PRC that 
granted it a considerable degree of autonomy.369 Though Kissinger noted that he agreed with 
most of the formulations in Rogers’ memorandum, he was skeptical of whether Peking would 
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accept the existence of Taiwan outside the control of the Mainland.370 In this regard, the National 
Security Advisor took a rather strange, almost contradictory approach to Taiwan- the United 
States could achieve full diplomatic recognition of the PRC while keeping its defense treaty with 
Taiwan.371 “Our movements will include guaranteed enforceable provisions for ensuring 
continued separate status for Taiwan if that is what Taiwan wants,” he told Ambassador 
McConaughy, saying he hoped to find an arrangement with the ROC so that “the US-Taiwan 
defense treaty does not lapse.”372 Indeed, in the face of greater ties between Peking and 
Washington, Taipei was by no means militarily abandoned. 
More Than A ‘Decent Interval’ 
Pursuant to the plan outlined in the Nixon Doctrine and the Shanghai Communique, 
Washington continued its plans to progressively withdraw American troops from Taiwan. Such a 
formula was not an isolated one in East Asia. Much the same could be observed in South 
Vietnam throughout the period of 1969-1973. In the decades since the pullout of US forces from 
Indochina, revelations about the Administration’s plans to provide a ‘decent interval’ between 
the American withdrawal from there and the actual demise of Saigon have drawn scrutiny 
towards Nixon, with scholars accusing him of duplicity towards America’s Asian allies. Taiwan, 
however, was a different case entirely. In the aftermath of the Shanghai Communique, the Nixon 
Administration stuck by its plans to strengthen the ROC while reducing the United States’ 
extensive presence there. This defense arrangement was further underwritten by the mutual 
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security guarantee of the MDA. Far from a ‘sellout’ on par with that of South Vietnam, the level 
of backing which Washington continued to provide Taipei indicated that the Nixon 
Administration intended to uphold its defense commitments.  
Both the specializations and pace of the troops withdrawn from Taiwan in the aftermath 
of the Communique spoke volumes about the way the Nixon Administration viewed its presence 
on the island. In fact, the primary forces being pulled out in the post-1972 period of the Nixon 
Administration were not those attached to MAAG Taiwan or serving in theater-level roles, but 
those linked to the de-escalating wars in Indochina.373 As the State Department maintained, the 
ongoing withdrawals “stem[ed] more from the American disengagement in Vietnam than from 
the new policy of better relations with Peking.”374 The Department of Defense, meanwhile, 
strongly advocated for a large stay-behind contingent to remain active on the island. In a 1972 
report, Defense Secretary Laird outlined that the United States should plan to maintain a 
presence of around 4,500 men on the island, even in the event that a peace settlement was 
reached in Indochina.375 At the start of the Nixon presidency in 1969, US troops on Taiwan had 
numbered 9,243 but, pursuant to Laird’s design, this number had been reduced to 4,619 by 
1974.376 Those remaining largely occupied intelligence, training, logistical, and advisory roles. 
Equally important, the troops on the island symbolically reaffirmed the strength of the US-ROC 
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MDA. According to one Department of Defense report, “[ROC] officials foresee the continued 
psychological and political requirement for a visible U.S. military presence throughout the area 
to be the best deterrence against aggression in the years ahead.”377 It is worth noting that in spite 
of the drawdown of conventional forces, the US continued to maintain its nuclear-armed F-4s at 
Tainan Air Force Base, indicating that the Nixon Administration still felt the need to provide a 
strong deterrent against an attack on Taiwan.378 As one policy paper advised in 1973, the United 
States had to maintain such armaments in the region “as a hedge against the failure of a 
conventional defense...in the event of a major PRC attack.”379  ‘Tensions in the area’ were 
diminishing in Southeast Asia, but without a renunciation of force from the PRC, a cross-strait 
conflict necessitating the use of nuclear weapons was still a real- if remote- possibility.   
To fill the void left by the incremental withdrawals of US forces, the Nixon 
Administration continued to supply the ROC with military equipment. These assistance 
programs, as Laird noted in 1972, were necessary to balance the demands of the Nixon Doctrine 
with the strength of American defense commitments to Taiwan.380 Richard T. Kennedy of the 
NSC staff would carry this point to Kissinger in an April 7, 1973 stating that current military 
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sales to Taiwan were “consistent with Taiwan’s continually improving economy, our 
commitment to the [ROC], and the self-sufficiency aspects of the Nixon Doctrine.”381 With this 
in mind, the trends apparent in US military aid to the ROC from 1969 to 1971 had stayed 
constant following the ‘opening’ of Peking.382 Being "flush with cash reserves and in a position 
to buy," FMS agreements continued to supplant grant aid given under MAP.383 In 1972- the year 
that the Shanghai Communique was issued- the US delivered an estimated $56,200,000 in arms 
sales to Taiwan, coupled with around $19,712,000 provided under MAP aid.384 The following 
year, the value of FMS deliveries to the ROC had grown larger still to reach $74,069,000.385 In 
1974, the United States had delivered around $96,141,000 in materiel to Taiwan- the most 
expensive FMS delivery to Taipei under the Nixon presidency.386 The rising tide of military sales 
spoke both to Taipei’s increasing ability to purchase arms, and the large role which American 
military equipment played in modernizing the ROC armed forces. In this way, military aid 
helped to make up for the apparent decline in the American presence on the island. Vis-a-vis 
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Peking, this would allow the Administration to “appear to be decreasing its military support 
while increasing Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.”387 
American economic aid, too, continued to bolster Taiwan’s economy well beyond the 
issuing of the Shanghai Communique. Indeed, after 1972, the Nixon Administration continued to 
look upon the island’s economic growth as both a guarantor of national security and political 
legitimacy.388 The United States’ Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) was instrumental towards this 
end. In 1972, the Bank furnished $187,806,00 in economic aid to the ROC, $149,850,000 of 
which was put towards the construction of a nuclear reactor by the Taiwan Power Company.389 
The following year, the amount which Eximbank issued dipped to around $159,049,068, and 
helped mostly to subsidize the country’s energy sector.390 At the conclusion of FY 1974, the 
credit amount granted by the Bank had increased to an impressive $239,499,300, with the 
Taiwan Power Company again receiving the bulk of the funds for its nuclear program that 
year.391 This influx of American foreign aid, combined with the international capital which its 
fruits attracted, helped to ensure Taiwan’s healthy GDP growth rate of 9.4%  over the period of 
1971-1980.392  
 
387 Keren Yarhi-Milo, et. al., “To Arm or To Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and 
Alliances,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 90–139, 111.  
388 CIA Directorate of Intelligence,  “Weekly Summary- Special Report: Nationalist China Revisited,” June 28, 1974, CIA FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r001500060012-3, 4 
389 Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Summary of Operations, Fiscal Year 1972,” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1972), https://www.digitalarchives.exim.gov/digital/collection/ExImD01/id/10061/rec/1, 38 
390 Export-Import Bank, “Statement of Condition Fiscal Year ‘73,”  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
https://www.digitalarchives.exim.gov/digital/collection/ExImD01/id/10135, 58-61.  
391 Export-Import Bank, “Annual Report 1974,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=z9fvd5w3JZEC&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA9, 30. 
392 Pan-Long Tsai, “Explaining Taiwan's Economic Miracle: Are the Revisionists Right?,” Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Reform, 1999, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1999), pp. 69-82. 
105 
 
Evaluating the American commitment to Taiwan by these metrics, the US security ties 
with the ROC can hardly be taken to be in decline post Nixon’s trip to China. While true that the 
nature of the MDA had been altered (in that Washington would no longer support a KMT 
‘reclamation’ of the Mainland), the alliance now assumed a largely defensive posture. Moreover, 
the steps which Washington took at this time aimed to make Taiwan more self-sufficient, both 
militarily and economically. Through a combination of its own initiatives and American support, 
the ROC was weathering the diplomatic setbacks it experienced in the early 1970s, setting in 
motion its transformation from a peripheral government in-exile to a viable political actor.  
The Soviet Counterweight 
It was not only the American defense commitment which helped to ensure the ROC’s 
enduring security. As the level of US-PRC contacts increased over the period of 1969-1974, 
Peking had noticeably altered its dogmatic stance on Taiwan’s ‘liberation.’ To be sure, the 
PRC’s own internal divisions had contributed to its growing pragmatism on the Taiwan issue, 
but external factors in Asia were equally important. Notable among these considerations was the 
aggressive posture of the Soviet Union along China’s northern border. 
Just as Moscow’s posturing had pushed the United States and PRC towards 
accommodation starting in 1969, the continued deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations 
inadvertently helped to ensure Taiwan’s security. Years after the Ussuri River clash, Central 
Asia remained a major flashpoint between the two communist states. As such, Peking continued 
to strengthen its military in the region to counter a possible attack by the Red Army. 
Additionally, it had begun constructing missile sites in its northern regions for the purpose of 
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delivering nuclear strikes “to targets deep within the Soviet Union.”393 The CIA noted this 
pattern, observing in one 1972 report that the main focus of PRC military preparations were 
largely directed against the Soviet Union, relegating the issue of Taiwan to the “sidelines” in 
terms of Peking’s security concerns.394 The allocation of troops for a possible conflict in Central 
Asia thus helped to tie down the PLA far away from Taiwan, limiting the chances of a PRC 
buildup to ‘liberate’ the island. “Clearly the Soviet threat-in both the short and the long term- 
ha[s] become the dominant factor in [Communist] Chinese strategic planning,” one American 
intelligence estimate concluded.395  
 The second factor was the role which Washington itself played in this dynamic. Peking 
conceived of the United States as a potential ally against a Soviet invasion, which Nixon had 
established by assuring Mao that America would “oppose any effort of others to interfere with 
the PRC.”396 The Soviets, too, sensed that the United States had a vested interest in ensuring 
Peking’s security, which helped to restrain Moscow’s designs on Central Asia.397  Not wanting to 
damage this advantageous relationship, the PRC decided to refrain from any actions which 
would anger the United States, among them being aggression against Taiwan. In the face of this 
consideration, an assault against the island was unlikely, if wholly self-defeating. “An actual 
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attack on Taiwan would divert considerable military resources from China’s defense against a 
possible Soviet thrust,” one NSC report stated, and consequently, “destroy the nascent 
relationship with Washington.”398 This point was echoed by the State Department, which went as 
far as to describe better US-PRC relations as having a greater deterrent effect against an invasion 
than even the military guarantee of the MDA.399 
 Taiwan’s security was one of the collateral effects of Kissinger’s ‘triangular diplomacy’ 
framework. Herein, Peking feared that an attack on the ROC would sever US-PRC ties, and 
worse still, invite another Soviet incursion along its Central Asian border. If ensuring itself 
against an existential war with the USSR meant foregoing an attempt to ‘retake’ Taiwan, Peking 
proved it was willing to accept the status quo for the sake of its survival. The PRC had thus 
traded a tactical concern (Taiwan) for a strategic one (defense against a Soviet invasion). This 
was the point which the Nixon Administration had hoped to prevail upon Peking’s diplomats 
since it first began its attempts to ‘open’ China. In this way, the Nixon Administration’s 
rapprochement with the PRC helped to ensure Taiwan’s security, not abandon it.  
A Long Stalemate 
But just how feasible was the Administration's hope for a peaceful resolution to the 
Taiwan Strait crisis? In light of its improved relations with Washington, Peking did back off its 
more aggressive rhetoric of retaking Taiwan by force, preferring instead to bombard the island 
with pro-unification propaganda rather than bombs.400 Taipei, meanwhile, was less than enthused 
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with the PRC’s public efforts to build support for unification. So long as the KMT remained in 
power and felt sufficiently assured by the US-ROC MDA, they felt little pressure to come to an 
accommodation with Peking.401 This was especially true as more native Taiwanese entered the 
ROC bureaucracy, stiffening the country’s conception of itself as being a distinct entity from 
‘China.’ In light of this, Taipei’s policy of “no contact and no negotiation” with Peking was 
likely to continue, even past the rule of the KMT.402 In short, Nixon and Kissinger’s hope for a 
peaceful resolution was a fantasy. Instead of creating the conditions for peace between the two 
Chinas, the Administration continued to accept a cross-strait stalemate. The President was at 
least partially aware of this, remarking to Kissinger that the ROC was “never going to say, ‘all 
right, we’re now going to become part of the PRC.’ Never.”403 Nixon was correct in his 
assumption that in the long term, Taipei’s hostility to unification would remain constant. “Since 
Taiwan was unwilling to accept unification with the mainland,” Gang Lin and Wenxing Zhou 
have argued, “the peaceful settlement that the U.S. Taiwan policy...emphasized actually meant 
no [support for] unification, suggesting that Taiwan abandonment was not on the policy 
agenda.”404 
In Peking, the issue of the American defense commitment to Taiwan progressively abated 
towards the end of the Nixon Administration. Chou had indicated as much in a 1973 meeting 
with Kissinger when he stated that the PRC had “no such plan at the moment” to liberate Taiwan 
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through military means.405 Kissinger took such assurances from Zhou to be a positive 
development, stating that he hoped that a normalization of Sino-American relations could take 
place within Nixon’s second term.406 Some, like John Holdridge of the National Security Council 
even observed that some PRC politicians (Mao among them) had begun to suggest that the US-
ROC relationship no longer remained “an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-American 
relations.”407 At this juncture, the US-PRC relationship was developing in a way which 
Washington saw favorable to its interests, and this cross-strait arrangement was at least tolerable 
to both sides. In an albeit facetious way, Mao carried that message to Kissinger in one of their 
final meetings. “When I go to heaven to see God,” the Chairman noted, “I’ll tell him it’s better to 
have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.”408  
The appointment of Leonard Unger to succeed Walter McConaughy as US ambassador to 
the ROC did much to ensure Taiwan’s sense of the American commitment to the island.409 On 
May 23, 1974, Unger met with Chiang Ching-kuo to deliver four assurances to Taipei on 
Washington's behalf.410 First, the message conveyed that Washington stood by its commitments 
embodied in the 1954 MDA.411 Second, the United States would continue its efforts to normalize 
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relations with Peking, noting that “the existing form of the relationship meets our current 
needs.”412 Third, the Administration would continue to cooperate with the ROC to aid its 
economic growth.413 Lastly, the message stated that “we will not turn our back on our friends and 
will consult with the Government of the Republic of China before taking any actions which 
could have a significant effect on the interests of [Taipei].”414 Though US-PRC relations were 
moving in the direction of full diplomatic recognition, the Administration believed that this 
would not compromise the security relationship with Taiwan. 
Unfortunately for Nixon, the ultimate arrangement which his Administration sought to 
reach in regards to normalizing relations with the PRC and retaining its security relationship with 
the ROC did not materialize. Following the scandal caused by the Watergate break-ins, the 
President resigned on August 9th, 1974.415 Though Kissinger remained at the forefront of foreign 
policymaking in the successive administration of Gerald Ford, whatever design Nixon had for a 
triangular balance of security ties between Washington, Peking, and Taipei went down with him. 
In place of a ‘peaceful solution,’ the United States instead acted to create a modus vivendi 
between the ‘two Chinas.’ While this stalemate was conducive to the interests of the Nixon 
Administration, it was less so for Peking and Taipei. In the absence of a negotiated settlement or 
a renunciation of force by the PRC, the Taiwan Strait remained a geopolitical flashpoint. Indeed, 
Washington had simply acted to put cross-strait tensions on hold. 
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Conclusion: Strategic Ambiguity 
 To outline American options on the security relationship with Taiwan, President Ford 
directed the creation of a study on US-ROC defense provisions through NSSM 212.416 On 
November 12, 1974, the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and the Pacific 
delivered its response to this memorandum. Their report operated under the assumption that US-
PRC normalization would persist and that the United States would keep its security 
commitments to Taiwan.417 As the study affirmed, the future of the ROC’s defense depended on 
“the deterrent effect of the [current] US-PRC relationship,” “the U.S. security treaty and the 
remaining U.S. force presence on Taiwan,” and “ROC access to U.S. military equipment.”418 
Regarding the options facing the Ford Administration, the response to NSSM 212 suggested a 
number of levels at which the United States should provide military aid to Taiwan. The 
conclusion which the National Security Council arrived at was that Washington should continue 
to furnish new weaponry to the ROC, albeit with some restraint.419 This would allow the 
Administration “to maintain a balance between accommodating PRC sensitivities and fulfilling 
ROC needs for psychological confidence in its security.”420  
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 The process of normalization under the Ford Administration accelerated rapidly, 
particularly due to Kissinger’s maneuvering on the issue of Taiwan. At a November 26, 1974 
meeting with Teng Hsiao-p’ing, the National Security Advisor conceded that the annulment of 
the US-ROC MDA would have to follow necessarily from full diplomatic recognition of Peking, 
as if the United States were to accept full PRC sovereignty over Taiwan in the future, it would be 
impossible to have a defense treaty with Taipei.421 Therefore, to Kissinger, the United States’ 
relationship with Taiwan would need to progressively assume an informal role, wherein the 
general American guarantee of the island against invasion and Peking’s improving ties with 
Washington would act to ensure a peaceful solution of the crisis by the Chinese themselves. In 
this regard, he did not see the 1954 MDA as the primary deterrent against an invasion by the 
Communist Chinese. Instead, Kissinger believed that Taiwan’s deterrence against forceful 
‘liberation’ was the sum of the infeasibility of a PRC invasion and the fact that this action would 
destroy the burgeoning ties between Washington and Peking.422 This was a radical departure 
from the position he had taken while working as National Security Advisor for the Nixon 
Administration, wherein he had emphasized early on to ROC, PRC, and American diplomats the 
need to maintain the MDA in a legally binding way. Now, Kissinger advised President Ford that 
Washington should seek “to sustain Taiwan's security by political rather than legalistic means,” 
while still adhering to the policy that “we will not permit Taiwan to be overwhelmed by military 
force.”423 Such a guarantee would be required to ensure a peaceful resolution, pursuant to the 
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response to NSSM 212 which stipulated that “some form of U.S. involvement in Taiwan’s 
security will continue to be important to inhibit the possibility of force being used to resolve the 
issue.”424 In Washington’s view, the United States could maintain its security ties to Taipei even 
in the absence of the formal terms outlined in the MDA. Ford had indicated this in a letter to 
Chiang Ching-kuo, stating that upon taking office, his administration had “reaffirmed our 
worldwide commitments, including our commitment to the security of the Republic of China,” 
and added that, “I can assure you that we do not forget our friends.”425  
Following the Ford Administration, President Jimmy Carter moved far more quickly than 
any of his predecessors on the issue of establishing full diplomatic relations with Peking. On 
December 15, 1978, he announced that not only would the United States be recognizing the 
PRC, but that it would formally annul the 1954 MDA which the Nixon Administration had 
attempted to maintain.426 This occurred in the absence of any formal renunciation of force by 
Peking. Though this was the end of the legally binding relationship between Washington and 
Taipei, it was not the end of their defense partnership. Seeking to maintain American defense 
and informal diplomatic ties with the ROC, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) by 
an overwhelming majority.427 Per the provisions of the document, the United States would 
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continue to provide defense materiel to Taiwan and, most importantly would consider a PRC 
attack on the island to be “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of 
grave concern to the United States.”428 Short of an outright declaration that the United States was 
bound by treaty to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, the TRA marked the beginning of a new 
era in US-ROC security ties- the age of ‘strategic ambiguity.’ As Carter understood it, this 
arrangement gave the United States “the option of going to war and protecting Taiwan” in the 
case of a PRC attack.429 This dynamic was indicative of the fact that the United States did not 
need to formally recognize Taiwan or have a mutual defense treaty with them in order to have a 
security relationship with the ROC.  
The Carter Administration’s decision to annul the MDA with Taiwan represented 
Washington’s effort to cut the gordian knot embodied in the Nixon-era concept of ‘constructive 
ambiguity.’ Admittedly, this concept attempted to rationalize what was the increasingly 
untenable position that the US could somehow normalize relations with Peking while 
maintaining its formal defense alliance with Taipei. The TRA represented a remedy to this, 
trading Nixon's tacit alliance with Peking for a tacit alliance with Taipei.430   
Over the period of 1969-1974, the Nixon Administration made every effort to preserve its 
security ties with the ROC within the limits of opening the PRC. The reconfiguration of 
Washington’s Taiwan defense policy during this time was a dialectical process, wherein both 
American and Communist Chinese diplomats pressed one another to be pragmatic about their 
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foreign policy goals. Decidedly not an outright sellout, the United States sought avenues by 
which Taipei would be insured against a forcible re-unification with the Mainland, through the 
legal route of the MDA, the military route of arms sales, and the psychological route afforded by 
triangular diplomacy. As ‘constructive ambiguity’ gave way to ‘strategic ambiguity,’ 
Washington maintained an underlying interest in the solution of the Straits crisis by peaceful 
means, discouraging both sides from aggression against the other. Increasingly, however, this 
situation froze into a protracted stalemate, owing both to Peking’s reluctance to upset its ‘tacit 
alliance’ with the United States and Taipei’s unwillingness to negotiate with its enemies on the 
Mainland. Though the Nixon Administration had managed to keep its formal treaty 
commitments to the ROC, it failed to settle the cross-strait tensions that had existed since 1949. 
Tensions in the area may have been reduced from the American perspective, but the animosity 
between the CCP and KMT had dissipated little by the time the President left office in mid 1974.  
In the modern age, the US-ROC relationship remains a complicated one. Held together 
by a mixture of informal diplomatic ties, ambiguous assurances, and substantial arms sales on 
credit, the partnership between Washington and Peking is nonetheless a vital one in the Pacific. 
Events over the past decade, however, portend that this arrangement may be tested sooner rather 
than later.431 As of late, Peking’s rhetoric concerning its designs against Taiwan has indicated 
that the country may aim to ‘liberate’ the island in the near, if not immediate future.  
Concomitantly, the PRC’s rapidly accelerating naval buildup is continuing to outpace the rate at 
which the United States is able to provide sustenance for Taiwan’s well-funded yet small 
 




military.432 In the absence of the formal defense ties which the Nixon Administration attempted 
to maintain, the United States at present has to rely on planting the idea in Peking’s mind that 
Washington will intervene to protect Taiwan, even if only bound by an act of Congress to 
consider intervention. This is the substance of strategic ambiguity. What bankrolls this notion is 
the maintenance of American military strength, the trust of Washington's allies, and the 
reluctance which those considerations generate in the minds of its competitors. In this 
arrangement, the United States’ credibility continues to translate directly into deterrence. 
American security ties to Taiwan are no exception, whether embodied in treaties or implicitly 
maintained through strategic ambiguity. Should this deterrent capacity fail, and should Peking 
make good on its promises to ‘liberate’ Taiwan in the future, the resulting conflict would not just 
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